# 1AC

### Contention 1- Rule of Law

#### Afghanistan is adopting detention policies modeled off US law- this makes instability inevitable

Rodgers 12 (Chris Rogers is a human rights lawyer for the Open Society Foundations specializing in human rights and conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan, May 14, “Karzai's bid for a dictatorial detention law”, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/14/karzais\_bid\_for\_a\_dictatorial\_detention\_law)

As part of the agreement to transfer control of Bagram, the Afghan government is creating the authority to hold individuals without charge or trial for an indefinite period of time on security grounds-a power it has never before said it needed. While such "administrative detention" regimes are permissible under the laws of war, this new detention power is being established in order to hand over a U.S. detention facility, not because changes in the conflict have convinced Afghan officials that it is necessary. A surge in U.S. detention operations like night raids has driven the prison population to over 3,000 detainees, most of whom the United States lacks evidence against for prosecution under Afghans law. Because the Afghan constitution, like the United States', protects individuals from being detained without charge or trial, the Afghan government needs a new detention law, which is now being modeled on deeply problematic U.S. detention policies and practices. As a result, Bagram's real legacy may be the establishment of a detention regime that will be ripe for abuse in a country with pervasive corruption and weak rule of law. Despite potentially far-reaching consequences, the development of this new detention power has been hidden from public view. When I met with leading Afghan lawyers and civil society organizations in Kabul several weeks ago, few knew that the government was proposing to create a new, non-criminal detention regime. Their reaction was disbelief and dismay. None had even seen a copy of the proposed regime, which the Afghan government has not made public and is trying to adopt by presidential fiat. The Open Society Foundations recently obtained a copy of the proposed detention regime, and after review, we have found what it details deeply troubling. The proposed changes leave open critical questions about the nature and scope of this proposed detention regime, which if left unanswered make it ripe for abuse. Who can be held in administrative detention and for how long? Where will it apply? When will the government cease to have this power? How will the government ensure it will not be abused to imprison the innocent or suppress political opposition? Most alarming is the failure to address the serious, long-term risks posed by such a regime. From apartheid South Africa to modern day China, administrative detention regimes adopted on security grounds have too often been used as tools of repression. In Egypt, the former government used administrative detention for decades to commit gross human rights violations and suppress political opposition, relying on a state of emergency declared in 1958, and nominally lifted only after last year's revolution. Across the border in Pakistan, the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulations are another stark reminder of the long, dark shadow that such legal regimes can cast. The ongoing imposition of these British, colonial-era laws, which among other things legalize collective punishment and detention without trial, are cited by many as a key driver of the rise of militancy in the tribal areas of Pakistan. But there is still time for the United States to avoid this legacy in Afghanistan. If the Afghan government cannot be dissuaded from adopting an administrative detention regime, then the United States should urge the Afghan government to include provisions that limit its scope and reduce its vulnerability to abuse. First, a ‘sunset' provision should be adopted, which would impose a time limit on such powers, or require an act by the Afghan Parliament to extend their duration. Second, the regime should be limited to individuals currently held by the United States at Bagram prison. There is no clear reason why the handover of Bagram detainees requires the creation of a nation-wide administrative detention regime. More generally, the scope of who can be detained must be clearly defined and limited. Third, detainees must have right to counsel as well as access to the evidence used against them in order to have a meaningful opportunity to challenge their detention-a fundamental right in international law. At present it seems the government will follow the well-documented due process shortfalls of the U.S. model. The United States and its Afghan partners must be honest about the serious, long-term risks of establishing an administrative detention regime in Afghanistan-particularly one that lacks clear limits and is democratically unaccountable. Protection from arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life or liberty is at the constitutional core of the United States, and is essential to lasting stability and security in Afghanistan. Living up to the President's promise of responsibly ending the war in Afghanistan requires defending, not betraying this principle.

#### Detention policy has prevented rule of law restoration in Afghanistan- judicial modeling makes US action key

ICG 10 (International Crisis Group, November 17, “REFORMING AFGHANISTAN’S BROKEN JUDICIARY”, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx)

U.S. detention policy has frequently been cited by Afghan and international legal experts as one of the chief obstacles to restoring balance to the Afghan justice system and citizens’ faith in the rule of law.233 The operation of parallel U.S.-controlled prisons has been problematic from the start. Thousands of Afghans have been detained since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 without recourse to trial or the means to challenge their detention. Abuse of prisoners at the U.S.-run Bagram Theatre Internment Facility in the early years of its operation under the Bush administration has been well documented, including the use of harsh interrogation techniques that resulted in the deaths of two Afghans.234 Extrajudicial detentions at Bagram have eroded support for foreign troops and for many Afghans – Pashtuns in particular – stand as a symbol of oppression. Like its sister facility at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo, Cuba, the Bagram prison has provided much grist for Taliban propaganda mills.235 U.S. officials under the Obama administration appear to have begun to recognise that extrajudicial detentions have negatively impacted Afghan perceptions of the rule of law. In January 2009, the U.S. government announced plans to close the facility at Guantanamo and to re-evaluate its detainee programs overall. A U.S. federal district court ruling in April 2009 concluding that non-Afghan detainees held at the Bagram facility have a right to challenge their detention in American courts has hastened the need to find solutions to the legal conundrum posed by the extrajudicial status of prisoners at Bagram.236 In September 2009, the U.S. Department of Defense adopted a new framework for evaluating the status of detainees in U.S. facilities in Afghanistan. Responsibility for detainee policy and operations now falls to Task Force 435, an interagency unit under joint military-civilian leadership whose mission is to bring detention and rule of law practices in line with U.S. strategic goals in Afghanistan. The old Bagram facility has since been replaced by the more modern Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), which opened in 2009 at the edge of the Bagram military base. Under this new policy, new detainee review board (DRB) procedures were adopted to bring detention practices in Afghanistan more in line with U.S. and international law. They replaced the Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Boards, which had been generally deemed inadequate because they afforded detainees few, if any, opportunities to challenge their arrest or to review evidence in cases brought against them in closed hearings. Under the new procedures, a military panel determines if a detainee has been properly captured and poses a future threat to the Afghan government or international security forces. Although the U.S. government is careful not to characterise the proceedings as legal or adversarial in the sense that a trial might be, detainees are allowed to some extent to present their version of events with the help of a U.S.-assigned “personal representative”. Hundreds of detainees have had their cases reviewed since the new review procedures were adopted and a number have been released because of insufficient evidence that they posed a threat to the Afghan government.237 These new guidelines are an important step forward, but they are far from replicating internationally recognised fair trial standards. A number of other actions must be taken to make U.S. detention policy more transparent, humane and fair and to bring it in line with international law. Specifically, U.S. investigation and intelligence gathering standards must be improved and the review board process must incorporate a more vigorous mechanism that allows detainees to review and challenge evidence brought against them, including measures for classified evidence. Transition to Afghan control of specially designated detainees will also necessitate a re-evaluation of classification procedures both at the point of capture and across agencies – both Afghan and U.S. The current process of declassifying information is far too cumbersome and there is a demand for greater clarity on the rules of transfer of information from coalition and Afghan sources to Afghan government sources.238 Changes in declassification policy will necessitate a serious review of current Afghan law and investigative practices and procedures employed by the Afghan National Directorate of Security and other security organs. In January 2010, the U.S. and Afghan government signed a memorandum of understanding calling for the DFIP to pass from U.S. to Afghan control in July 2011. By that time, review proceedings should be conducted entirely by Afghan judges and prosecutors; an Afghan judge in the Parwan provincial courts has already reviewed a number of detainee cases.239 The U.S. has set up a rule of law centre at the new facility with a view to training Afghan legal professionals to build cases against the roughly 1,100 detainees housed at the prison. The training and transition are important first steps toward dismantling the parallel legal systems that have co-existed uneasily in Afghanistan since the start of the U.S. military engagement. The transition could entail some tricky procedural challenges in terms of potential conflicts between Afghan courts and U.S. military authorities over the danger posed by “highrisk” detainees.240 This and other issues should be clarified before the transition in 2011.

#### Starting with US policy is key- it will restore credibility in our system and allows us to improve the Afghani justice system

Eviatar 12 (Daphne Eviatar Law and Security Program Human Rights First, 1-9, “The Latest Skirmish in Afghanistan: Hate to Say We Told You So”, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2012/01/09/the-latest-skirmish-in-afghanistan-hate-to-say-we-told-you-so/)

Responsibility begins with due process. As we wrote in our report in May, based on our observations of the hearings given to detainees at the U.S.-run detention facility at Bagram: “the current system of administrative hearings provided by the U.S. military fails to provide detainees with an adequate opportunity to defend themselves against charges that they are collaborating with insurgents and present a threat to U.S. forces.” As a result, the U.S. hearings “fall short of minimum standards of due process required by international law.” For President Karzai, that’s an argument that the U.S. should immediately turn the thousands of detainees it’s holding over to the government of Afghanistan. But that would do little to solve the problem. TheUnited Nations reported in October that Afghanistan’s intelligence service systematically tortures detainees during interrogations. The U.S. government cannot hand prisoners over to the Afghans if they’re likely to be tortured, according to its obligations under international law. And unfortunately, as we also noted in our report, the Afghan justice system, although improving with the growing introduction of defense lawyers, is still hardly a model of due process. Still, unlike the United States, at least Afghan law does not permit detention without criminal charge, trial and conviction. The United States hasn’t exactly proven itself the best model for the Afghan justice system. Restoring U.S. credibility is going to be key to our ability to withdraw from Afghanistan without it becoming a future threat to U.S. national security. The U.S. government can’t credibly insist that the Afghans improve their justice system and treatment of detainees if the U.S. military doesn’t first get its own detention house in order. Whether for the sake of international law, U.S. credibility, or merely to improve relations with the Karzai government, upon which U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan depends, the U.S. military needs to start providing real justice to the thousands of prisoners in its custody.

#### Judicial action is key to international credibility and restoring the rule of law

Hecht, 05 (Daryl, Judge for the Iowa Court of Appeals, 50 S.D. L. REV. 78, lexis)  
Americans proclaim with some justification that liberty and human rights are among the crown jewels of their national identity. Claiming the status of human rights watchdogs around the globe, representatives of the United States government commonly criticize human rights failures of other nations. If such criticism is to be taken seriously and carry force abroad when well-founded, the United States government must heed its own admonitions. It should accord due process not only to all persons detained within its borders but also to those it imprisons offshore at locations under the exclusive control of the United States. Affirmation by federal courts of the liberty interests of alien prisoners imprisoned on Guantanamo would give important symbolic assurance to citizens of the United States, foreign nationals, friends, and foes that liberty is a cherished universal human right that does not persist or perish according to technicalities such as geographic boundaries. As they clarify the nature and extent of process due the Guantanamo prisoners, federal courts will consider the Eisentrager Court's concerns about the prospect that thorough judicial review might disrupt war efforts. [288](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n288) The realities [\*111] of war may justify reasonable restriction of the process available to prisoners of war during times of armed conflict and justify some judicial deference allowing the executive to conduct military campaigns with a minimum of distraction. However, the risk that the war effort will be disrupted by judicial or administrative review of the grounds for detention are diminished in these cases because the prison is distant from the present theaters of war. Modern technology will facilitate the presentation of evidence at remote sites in ways not contemplated by the Court in the Eisentrager era and will render unpersuasive many of the Executive's war-powers arguments against meaningful judicial review. The recent commencement of administrative hearings conducted by the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and the discharge of some of the Guantanamo prisoners are positive developments. It remains to be seen whether federal courts will conclude these administrative tribunals within the Executive branch allow for meaningful review of the prisoners' status. Although passage of the Military Tribunals Act of 2003 would, especially with suggested amendments, alleviate many of the most egregious legal infirmities associated with the ongoing detention of uncharged prisoners, a timely legislative solution to the problem through the action of the political branches of government is unlikely. The best and perhaps only prospect for meaningful protection of the uncharged detainees' rights against indefinite imprisonment lies in the litigation pending in federal courts. The remaining uncharged prisoners have languished too long in prison without charge or access to counsel, and the courts must be vigilant to prevent the continuation of arbitrary detentions in violation of international humanitarian and human rights principles. Alien prisoners ought not be disqualified from fundamental constitutional protections solely as a consequence of the government's choice of an off-shore location for their confinement. If deprivation of aliens' property interests may legally be imposed within the United States only in conformity with due process principles, the liberty interests of aliens held on Guantanamo should receive no less protection against state action. It should be understood that arguments in favor of meaningful review of the status of the Guantanamo prisoners is not an argument for the immediate release of all aliens imprisoned on Guantanamo. The evidence presented in habeas proceedings or in fair administrative tribunal hearings may establish reasonable grounds to believe some petitioners are properly designated and detained as enemy combatants. Under international humanitarian law, they may be detained during the conflict, but it seems evident that the GPW did not contemplate perpetual imprisonment without charge during an interminable war. [289](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n289) The [\*112] evidence offered in a meaningful review process may support war crimes charges against some of the prisoners who will be tried before military commissions under the regulations adopted by the Department of Defense. If the evidence establishes that still other prisoners have, as they allege, been improvidently incarcerated, they should be promptly discharged. In Korematsu v. United States, [290](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n290) the Court deferred during a declared war to the Executive's decision to evacuate persons of Japanese ancestry from locations on the west coast and relocate them in internment camps without the benefit of charges or hearings. That decision has since been widely criticized, and at least one member of the Court later publicly regretted his vote to defer to the military's judgment of necessity. [291](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n291) In 1976, as part of the celebration of the Bicentennial of the Constitution, President Gerald Ford issued a proclamation acknowledging that the internment of the Japanese Americans, many of whom were citizens, during World War II was wrong and calling upon the United States to "resolve that this kind of action shall never again be repeated." [292](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n292) Federal courts now have the opportunity to revisit the appropriate balance between precious civil liberties and measures properly taken in furtherance of national security during times of crisis. As the proper balance is recalibrated to fit the circumstances presented in the Guantanamo litigation, the courts can interrupt the "all too easy slide from a case of genuine military necessity ... to one where the threat is not critical and the power [sought to be exercised is] either dubious or nonexistent." [293](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n293)If the Guantanamo litigation forces meaningful review of the prisoners' status, it will advance the rule of law and model a fundamental principle of international leadership. "If the UnitedStates represents values that others want to follow, it will cost us less to lead." [294](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n294) There is, of course, no doubt that the United States has the military power to ignore the prisoners' liberty interests and continue to hold them indefinitely without charge. But the raw power to maintain the status quo provides no legal justification consistent with reason, fundamental human rights, and principles of limited government for doing so.

#### Only restoring confidence in their judiciary system can make our post-drawdown COIN strategy successful

ICG 10 (International Crisis Group, November 17, “REFORMING AFGHANISTAN’S BROKEN JUDICIARY”, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx)

A substantial course correction is needed to restore the rule of law in Afghanistan. Protecting citizens from crime and abuses of the law is elemental to state legitimacy. Most Afghans do not enjoy such protections and their access to justice institutions is extremely limited. As a result, appeal to the harsh justice of the Taliban has become increasingly prevalent. In those rare instances when Afghans do appeal to the courts for redress, they find uneducated judges on the bench and underpaid prosecutors looking for bribes. Few judicial officials have obtained enough education and experience to efficiently execute their duties to uphold and enforce the law. Endemic problems with communications, transport, infrastructure and lack of electricity mean that it is likely that the Afghan justice system will remain dysfunctional for some time to come. Restoring public confidence in the judiciary is critical to a successful counter-insurgency strategy. The deep-seated corruption and high levels of dysfunction within justice institutions have driven a wedge between the government and the people. The insurgency is likely to widen further if Kabul does not move more swiftly to remove barriers to reform. The first order of business must be to develop a multi-year plan aimed at comprehensive training and education for every judge and prosecutor who enters the system. Pay-and-rank reform must be implemented in the attorney general’s office without further delay. Building human capacity is essential to changing the system. Protecting that capacity, and providing real security for judges, prosecutors and other judicial staff is crucial to sustaining the system as a whole. The international community and the Afghan government need to work together more closely to identify ways to strengthen justice institutions. A key part of any such effort will necessarily involve a comprehensive assessment of the current judicial infrastructure on a province-byprovince basis with a view to scrutinising everything from caseloads to personnel performance. This must be done regularly to ensure that programming and funding for judicial reform remains dynamic and responsive to real needs. More emphasis must be placed on public education about how the system works and where there are challenges. Transparency must be the rule of thumb for both the government and the international community when it comes to publishing information about judicial institutions. Little will change without more public dialogue about how to improve the justice system. The distortions created in the justice system by lack of due process and arbitrary detentions under both Afghan institutions and the U.S. military are highly problematic. Until there is a substantial change in U.S. policy that provides for the transparent application of justice and fair trials for detainees, the insurgency will always be able to challenge the validity of the international community’s claim that it is genuinely interested in the restoration of the rule of law. If the international community is serious about this claim, then more must be done to ensure that the transition from U.S. to Afghan control of detention facilities is smooth, transparent and adheres to international law.

#### Unsuccessful drawdown makes nuclear war inevitable

Cronin 13 (Audrey Kurth Cronin is Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University and author of How Terrorism Ends and Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria. Thinking Long on Afghanistan: Could it be Neutralized? Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 36:1 pp. 55\_72<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.751650>)

With ISAF withdrawal inevitable, a sea change is already underway: the question is whether the United States will be ahead of the curve or behind it. Under current circumstances, key actions within Afghanistan by any one state are perceived to have a deleterious effect on the interests of other competing states, so the only feasible solution is to discourage all of them from interfering in a neutralized state. As the United States draws down over the next two years, yielding to regional anarchy would be irresponsible. Allowing neighbors to rely on bilateral measures, jockey for relative position, and pursue conflicting national interests without regard for dangerous regional dynamics will result in a repeat of the pattern that has played out in Afghanistan for the past thirty years\_/except this time the outcome could be not just terrorism but nuclear war.

#### Judicial reform and COIN are key to long term stability

The Nation 9 (Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/11-Nov-2009/UN-body-urges-Karzai-to-fight-corruption)

UNITED NATIONS - The UN General Assembly has urged the government of re-elected Afghan President Hamid Karzai to press ahead with “strengthening of the rule of law and democratic processes, the fight against corruption (and) the acceleration of justice sector reform.” The 192-member assembly made that call Monday night by unanimously adopting a resolution that also declared that Afghanistan’s presidential election “credible” and “legitimate”, despite allegations of widespread fraud that led Karzai’s main challenger Abdullah Abdullah to pull out of the run-off round of the election. But the UN assembly raised no doubts about Karzai’s mandate or his right to continue leading the war-torn country. The resolution welcomed “the efforts of the relevant institutions to address irregularities identified by the electoral institutions in Afghanistan and to ensure a credible and legitimate process in accordance with the Afghan Election Law and in the framework of the Afghan Constitution.” It appealed to the international community to help Afghanistan in countering the challenges of the militants’ attacks that threaten its democratic process and and economic development. Before the assembly approved the resolution, 24 countries, including Pakistan, spoke in the debate on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan in which they stressed the need for the Afghan Government and the global community to work closely together. Pakistan’s Acting Permanent Representative Amjad Hussain Sial said the core of violence and conflict in Afghanistan emanated from terrorist groups, foreign militants such as Al-Qaeda, and militant Taliban who were not prepared to reconcile and give up fighting. The nexus with drug traders was increasingly discernable. The key to long-term stability in Afghanistan, he said, was reformation of the country’s corrupt governmental systems. Equally important was building the civilian institutions at the central and subnational levels.

#### Instability results in multiple conflict scenarios specifically- Indo-Pak war

**Carafano ’10** (Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe By JAMES JAY CARAFANO   Saturday, Jan. 2, 2010 James Jay Carafano is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies)

There’s little chance Kabul will become Saigon 1968. If the war in Afghanistan starts going south for allied forces, President Obama will probably quit rather than risk getting bogged down. President Lyndon B. Johnson considered Vietnam more a distraction than a national mission, yet he ramped up the troop commitment all the same. In 1968, the North Vietnamese launched a major offensive during the Tet holiday. They lost that battle. Badly! But the fact that they were able to mount such a large-scale offensive gave many Americans—including Walter Cronkite—the impression that the war wasn’t winnable. As “the U.S. is bogged down” became the common view, Johnson’s presidency fell to ashes. Not much chance Obama will go that route. If the violence skyrockets next year and it looks as though the president’s ambitious objectives can’t be met, Afghanistan could look a lot more like Vietnam in 1973. U.S. forces withdrew. Our abandoned ally was soon overrun. South Vietnam became a gulag; Cambodia sprouted the killing fields; life in Laos was just plain lousy. By 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese war erupted. We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and nuclear-arms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over. State-sponsorship of terrorism came into fashion. Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game. Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India—potentially triggering a nuclear war between the two countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus as well. That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States. Our allies might rethink things as well. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. NATO might well fall apart. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations.

#### Limited Indo-Pak war causes extinction

Toon et al 7 – Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @ University of Colorado – ‘7 [Owen B. Toon, Alan Robock (Professor of Environmental Sciences @ Rutgers University), Richard P. Turco (Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @ UCLA, Charles Bardeen (Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @ University of Colorado), Luke Oman (Professor of of Earth and Planetary Sciences @ Johns Hopkins University), Georgiy L. Stenchikov (Professor of Environmental Sciences @ Rutgers University), “NUCLEAR WAR: Consequences of Regional-Scale Nuclear Conflicts,” Science, 2 March 2007, Vol. 315. no. 5816, pp. 1224 – 1225]

The world may no longer face a serious threat of global nuclear warfare, but regional conflicts continue. Within this milieu, acquiring nuclear weapons has been considered a potent political, military, and social tool (1-3). National ownership of nuclear weapons offers perceived international status and insurance against aggression at a modest financial cost. Against this backdrop, we provide a quantitative assessment of the potential for casualties in a regional-scale nuclear conflict, or a terrorist attack, and the associated environmental impacts (4, 5). Eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons. In addition, North Korea may have a small, but growing, arsenal. Iran appears to be seeking nuclear weapons capability, but it probably needs several years to obtain enough fissionable material. Of great concern, 32 other nations--including Brazil, Argentina, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan--have sufficient fissionable materials to produce weapons (1, 6). A de facto nuclear arms race has emerged in Asia between China, India, and Pakistan, which could expand to include North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan (1). In the Middle East, a nuclear confrontation between Israel and Iran would be fearful. Saudi Arabia and Egypt could also seek nuclear weapons to balance Iran and Israel. Nuclear arms programs in South America, notably in Brazil and Argentina, were ended by several treaties in the 1990s (6). We can hope that these agreements will hold and will serve as a model for other regions, despite Brazil's new, large uranium enrichment facilities. Nuclear arsenals containing 50 or more weapons of low yield [15 kilotons (kt), equivalent to the Hiroshima bomb] are relatively easy to build (1, 6). India and Pakistan, the smallest nuclear powers, probably have such arsenals, although no nuclear state has ever disclosed its inventory of warheads (7). Modern weapons are compact and lightweight and are readily transported (by car, truck, missile, plane, or boat) (8). The basic concepts of weapons design can be found on of the Internet. The only serious obstacle to constructing a bomb is the limited availability of purified fissionable fuels.There are many political, economic, and social factors that could trigger a regional-scale nuclear conflict, plus many scenarios for the conduct of the ensuing war. We assumed (4) that the densest population centers in each country--usually in megacities--are attacked. We did not evaluate specific military targets and related casualties. We considered a nuclear exchange involving 100 weapons of 15-kt yield each, that is, ~0.3% of the total number of existing weapons (4). India and Pakistan, for instance, have previously tested nuclear weapons and are now thought to have between 109 and 172 weapons of unknown yield (9). Fatalities were estimated by means of a standard population database for a number of countries that might be targeted in a regional conflict (see figure, above). For instance, such an exchange between India and Pakistan (10) could produce about 21 million fatalities--about half as many as occurred globally during World War II. The direct effects of thermal radiation and nuclear blasts, as well as gamma-ray and neutron radiation within the first few minutes of the blast, would cause most casualties. Extensive damage to infrastructure, contamination by long-lived radionuclides, and psychological trauma would likely result in the indefinite abandonment of large areas leading to severe economic and social repercussions. Fires ignited by nuclear bursts would release copious amounts of light-absorbing smoke into the upper atmosphere. If 100 small nuclear weapons were detonated within cities, they could generate 1 to 5 million tons of carbonaceous smoke particles (4), darkening the sky and affecting the atmosphere more than major volcanic eruptions like Mt. Pinatubo (1991) or Tambora (1815) (5). Carbonaceous smoke particles are transported by winds throughout the atmosphere but also induce circulations in response to solar heating. Simulations (5) predict that such radiative-dynamical interactions would loft and stabilize the smoke aerosol, which would allow it to persist in the middle and upper atmosphere for a decade. Smoke emissions of 100 low-yield urban explosions in a regional nuclear conflict would generate substantial global-scale climate anomalies, although not as large as in previous "nuclear winter" scenarios for a full-scale war (11, 12). However, indirect effects on surface land temperatures, precipitation rates, and growing season lengths (see figure, below) would be likely to degrade agricultural productivity to an extent that historically has led to famines in Africa, India, and Japan after the 1783-1784 Laki eruption (13) or in the northeastern United States and Europe after the Tambora eruption of 1815 (5). Climatic anomalies could persist for a decade or more because of smoke stabilization, far longer than in previous nuclear winter calculations or after volcanic eruptions. Studies of the consequences of full-scale nuclear war show that indirect effects of the war could cause more casualties than direct ones, perhaps eliminating the majority of the world's population (11, 12). Indirect effects such as damage to transportation, energy, medical, political, and social infrastructure could be limited to the combatant nations in a regional war. However, climate anomalies would threaten the world outside the combat zone. The predicted smoke emissions and fatalities per kiloton of explosive yield are roughly 100 times those expected from estimates for full-scale nuclear attacks with high-yield weapons (4).

#### Deterrence doesn’t check escalation

Weitz 10 [Richard, writes a weekly column on Asia-Pacific strategic and security issues. He is director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, The Diplomat, South Asia’s Nuclear War Risk

July 12, 2010, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/07/12/south-asia%e2%80%99s-nuclear-war-risk/4/?print=yes]

Yet even setting aside the question of nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands, nuclear competition between India and Pakistan is especially dangerous. Active (and ongoing) political disputes between the two countries have resulted in three past wars as well as numerous proxy conflicts. Pakistani leaders in particular have concluded that their nuclear arsenal has deterred India from again using its conventional forces to attack Pakistani territory. As a result, Pakistan’s implicit nuclear doctrine presumes the possible first use of nuclear weapons. The risks of such tensions are compounded by the physical proximity of the two countries, as well as their reliance on ballistic missiles as delivery vehicles, which means that early warning times might be as little as five to ten minutes. Although it remains unclear whether India or Pakistan have combined its nuclear warheads with their assigned delivery systems, such a precarious stance would increase the risks of both accidental and catalytic war (a nuclear conflict between both governments precipitated by a third party, such as a terrorist group). Throw China into the mix, with Pakistan at risk of viewing its own nuclear programme as increasingly inadequate as India seeks to achieve mutual deterrence with China, and the picture becomes more complicated. And add in the risk of widespread political disorder in either India or Pakistan, which could see a dangerous political adventurism as political leaders look to rally domestic support, and the peculiar challenges posed by the region become clearer. The fact is South Asia is particularly prone to a destabilizing arms race. And perhaps nuclear war.

### Contention 2- Abstention

#### Failure of the Supreme Court to substantively rule on detention authority causes judicial abstention on national security issues

Vaughns 13 (B.A. (Political Science), J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.Of Civil Wrongs and Rights: Kiyemba v. Obama and the Meaning of Freedom, Separation of Powers, and the Rule of Law Ten Years After 9/11 ASIAN AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL [Volume 20:7])

After being reversed three times in a row in Rasul, Hamdan, and then Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit finally managed in Kiyemba to reassert, and have effectively sanctioned, its highly deferential stance towards the Executive in cases involving national security. In particular, the D.C. Circuit concluded that an order mandating the Uighurs’ release into the continental United States would impermissibly interfere with the political branches’ exclusive authority over immigration matters. But this reasoning is legal ground that the Supreme Court has already implicitly—and another three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit more explicitly—covered earlier. As such, the Bush administration’s strategy in employing the “war” paradigm at all costs and without any judicial intervention, while unsuccessful in the Supreme Court, has finally paid off in troubling, and binding, fashion in the D.C. Court of Appeals, where, national security fundamentalism reigns supreme and the Executive’s powers as “Commander-in-Chief” can be exercised with little, if any, real check; arguably leading to judicial abstention in cases involving national security. The consequences of the Kiyemba decision potentially continue today, for example, with passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012,246 which President Obama signed, with reservations, into law on December 31, 2011.247 This defense authorization bill contains detainee provisions that civil liberties groups and human rights advocates have strongly opposed.248 The bill’s supporters strenuously objected to the assertion that these provisions authorize the indefinite detention of U.S. citizens.249 In signing the bill, President Obama later issued a statement to the effect that although he had reservations about some of the provisions, he “vowed to use discretion when applying” them.250 Of course, that does not mean another administration would do the same, especially if courts abstain from their role as protectors of individual rights. In the years after 9/11, the Supreme Court asserted its role incrementally, slowly entering into the debate about the rights of enemy combatant detainees. This was a “somewhat novel role” for the Court.251 Unsurprisingly, in so doing, the Court’s intervention “strengthened detainee rights, enlarged the role of the judiciary, and rebuked broad assertions of executive power.”252 Also unsurprisingly, the Court’s decisions in this arena “prompted strong reactions from the other two branches.”253 This may be so because, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the Court had, in the past, recognized the primacy of liberty interests only in quieter times, after national emergencies had terminated or perhaps before they ever began.254 However, since the twentieth century, wartime has been the “normal state of affairs.”255 If perpetual war is the new “normal,” the political branches likely will be in a permanent state of alert. Thus, it remains for the courts to exercise vigilance and courage about protecting individual rights, even if these assertions of judicial authority come as a surprise to the political branches of government.256 But courts, like any other institution, are susceptible to being swayed by influences external to the law. Joseph Margulies and Hope Metcalf make this very point in a 2011 article, noting that much of the post-9/11 scholarship mirrors this country’s early wartime cases and “envisions a country that veers off course at the onset of a military emergency but gradually steers back to a peacetime norm once the threat recedes, via primarily legal interventions.”257 This model, they state, “cannot explain a sudden return to the repressive wilderness just at the moment when it seemed the country had recovered its moral bearings.”258 Kiyemba is very much a return to the repressive wilderness. In thinking about the practical and political considerations that inevitably play a role in judicial decisionmaking (or non-decisionmaking, as the case may be), I note that the Court tends to be reluctant to decide constitutional cases if it can avoid doing so, as it did in Kiyemba. Arguably, this doctrine of judicial abstention is tied to concerns of institutional viability, in the form of public perception, and to concerns about respecting the separation of powers.259 But, as Justice Douglas once famously noted, when considering the separation of powers, the Court should be mindful of Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition that “it is a constitution we are expounding.”260 Consequently, “[i]t is far more important [for the Court] to be respectful to the Constitution than to a coordinate branch of government.”261 And while brave jurists have made such assertions throughout the Court’s history, the Court is not without some pessimism about its ability to effectively protect civil liberties in wartimes or national emergencies. For example, in Korematsu—one of the worst examples of judicial deference in times of crisis—Justice Jackson dissented, but he did so “with explicit resignation about judicial powerlessness,” and concern that it was widely believed that “civilian courts, up to and including his own Supreme Court, perhaps should abstain from attempting to hold military commanders to constitutional limits in wartime.”262 Significantly, even when faced with the belief that the effort may be futile, Justice Jackson dissented. As I describe in the following section, that dissent serves a valuable purpose. But, for the moment, I must consider the external influences on the court that resulted in that feeling of judicial futility.

#### SCOTUS can restrain the president under authority granted by the Suspension Clause- that ensures precedent setting

Garrett 12 (Brandon, Roy L. and Rosamund Woodruff Morgan Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. HABEAS CORPUS AND DUE PROCESSCORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:47] page lexis)

The relationship between the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause has sweeping implications for the detention of suspected terrorists and military engagements in multiple countries after September 11, 2001. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court for the first time clearly gave the Suspension Clause independent force as an affirmative source of judicial power to adjudicate habeas petitions and as a source of meaningful process to prisoners in custody.15 As a consequence of this decision, Congress now cannot enact jurisdictions tripping legislation to deny executive detainees access to judicial review of the type that it has twice tried and failed to do in the past decade.16 A noncitizen detained as a national security threat may now have procedural rights to contest the detention.17 Even as the Executive has crafted nuanced positions on power and procedure for detaining persons for national security reasons, and even as Congress has adopted new detention-authorizing legislation,18 the judiciary continues to play a central role, though sometimes unwillingly and deferentially, in detention review.19 Apart from these specific developments, I argue that the reinvigorated Suspension Clause jurisprudence will continue to have ripple effects across all areas regulated by habeas corpus. What process must the government use to ensure that it detains the correct people? The traditional assumption was that the Due Process Clause provided the answers. Judges and scholars described a functional relationship in which due process supplied the rights while habeas provided the procedural means to vindicate them. Justice Antonin Scalia expressed this view in its starkest form in his INS v. St. Cyr dissent, arguing that the Suspension Clause “does not guarantee any content to (or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus.”20 Judges and scholars have long assumed that due process offers more protections than habeas corpus, or that the substance of habeas is coextensive with the Due Process Clause.21 Others have suggested that the Suspension Clause has a “structural” role, entwined with other individual rights guarantees.22 The U.S. government, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, adopted the view that noncitizens captured and detained abroad had no due process rights and thus no habeas remedy, and the D.C. Circuit agreed.23 In two cases that reshaped habeas jurisprudence, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, decided in 2004,24 and Boumediene, decided in 2008,25 the Court connected the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause in a new way. Hamdi seemed to indicate that the Due Process Clause approach had triumphed. The Hamdi plurality applied the cost-benefit due process test from Mathews v. Eldridge26 to outline the procedural rights of citizens who challenge their detention.27 Following Hamdi, the precise scope of what due process required seemed the “looming question” for the future of executive detention.28 In response, the government hastily implemented administrative screening procedures for detainees, ostensibly to comply with the bare minimum that due process appeared to require.29 In Boumediene, the Court chose a different constitutional path. The Court did not discuss whether Guant´anamo detainees had due process rights, but instead held that the Suspension Clause independently supplies process to ensure review of executive detention.30 The Court put to rest the notion that the Suspension Clause is an empty vessel and regulates only the conditions for congressional suspension of the writ. Instead, the Court held that the Suspension Clause itself extended “the fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus.”31 The Court’s view complements recent scholarship examining the common law origins of habeas corpus.32 However, while an- swering the Suspension Clause question, the ruling created another puzzle. The Court held that a prisoner should have a “meaningful opportunity” to demonstrate unlawful confinement, but it did not specify what process the Suspension Clause ensures, nor to what degree due process concerns influence the analysis.33 Lower court rulings elaborating on the process for reviewing detainee petitions have displayed confusion as to which sources to rely on.34 This Article tries to untangle this important knot.

#### Judicial abstention props up military adventurism and illegal arms sales

Scales and Spitz 12 (Ann Scales, prof at U Denver law school. Laura Spitz, prof at U Colorado Law School. The Jurisprudence of the Military-Industrial ComplexSeattle Journal for Social Justice Volume 1 | Issue 3 Article 51 10-11-2012)

First, our nation’s history and legitimacy rest upon a separation of military power from democratic governance. For that reason, the armed forces are subject to constitutional constraint. Second, however, as an aspect of separation of powers, courts try not to interfere in areas of foreign policy and military affairs. Often this is referred to as the “political question” doctrine, a determination that a matter is beyond the capabilities of judges. The strongest argument for this deference is that the political branches—or the military itself—have superior expertise in military matters. That may be true in some situations. I am not sure, for example, the Supreme Court would have been the best crowd to organize the invasion of Normandy. But what we now have is an increasingly irrational deference.7 Consider three cases: a. In Korematsu v. United States,8 the Supreme Court said the internment of Japanese-Americans at the beginning of 1942 was constitutional, based upon a military assessment of the possibility of espionage in preparation for a Japanese invasion of the United States. It turns out that the information provided by the military to the Supreme Court was falsified.9 But note two things: (1) the nation was in the midst of a declared world war, and (2) in subsequent less urgent circumstances, Korematsu would seem to argue strongly for military justifications to have to be based upon better, more reliable information than was offered there. b. In the 1981 case of Rostker v. Goldberg,10 the Supreme Court decided that it was constitutional for Congress to exclude women from the peacetime registration of potential draftees, even though both the Department of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff had testified that including women would increase military readiness. But Congress got the benefit of the military deference doctrine as a cover for what I think was a sinister political purpose—to protect the manliness of war—and the Supreme Court felt perfectly free to ignore what those with the real expertise had to say. c. Most recently, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,11 the Fourth Circuit held that a U.S. citizen who had been designated an “enemy combatant”12 could be detained indefinitely without access to counsel. In this case, however, not only is there no declared war,13 but also, the only evidence regarding Mr. Hamdi was a two-page affidavit by a Defense Department underling, Mr. Mobbs. Mobbs stated that Mr. Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan, and had been affiliated with a Taliban military unit. The government would not disclose the criteria for the “enemy combatant” designation, the statements of Mr. Hamdi that allegedly satisfied those criteria, nor any other bases for the conclusion of Taliban “affiliation.”14 And that is as good as the evidence for life imprisonment without trial has to be. Deference to the military has become abdication. In other words, what we presently have is not civilian government under military control, but something potentially worse, a civilian government ignoring military advice,15 but using the legal doctrine of military deference for its own imperialist ends. Third, the gigantic military establishment and permanent arms industry are now in the business of justifying their continued existences. This justification is done primarily, as you know, by retooling for post-Cold War enemies—the so-called “rogue states”—while at the same time creating new ones, for example by arming corrupt regimes in Southeast Asia.16 I was reminded of this recently when we went to see comedian Kate Clinton. She thought Secretary Powell had taken too much trouble in his presentation attempting to convince the Security Council that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.17 Why not, she asked, “just show them the receipts?” Fourth, we have seen the exercise of extraordinary influence by arms makers on both domestic and foreign policy. For domestic pork barrel and campaign finance reasons, obsolete or unproven weapons systems continue to be funded even when the military does not want them!18 And, just when we thought we had survived the nuclear arms race nightmare, the United States has undertaken to design new kinds of nuclear weapons,19 even when those designs have little military value.20 Overseas, limitations on arms sales are being repealed, and arms markets that should not exist are being constantly expanded21 for the sake of dumping inventory, even if those weapons are eventually used for “rogue” purposes by rogue states. This system skews security considerations, and militarizes foreign policy. Force has to be the preferred option because other conduits of policy are not sufficiently well-funded. Plus, those stockpiled weapons have got to be used or sold so that we can build more. Fifth, enlarging upon this in a document entitled The National Security Policy of the United States, we were treated last September to “the Bush doctrine,” which for the first time in U.S. history declares a preemptive strike policy. This document states, “America will act against emerging threats before they are fully formed.”22 If they are only emerging and not fully formed, you may wonder, how will we know they are “threats”? Because someone in Washington has that perception, and when the hunch hits, it is the official policy of this country to deploy the military.23 All options—including the use of nuclear weapons—are always on the table.

#### Presidential adventurism causes nuclear war

Symonds 13 [Peter, leading staff writer for the World Socialist Web Site and a member of its International Editorial Board. He has written extensively on Middle Eastern and Asian politics, contributing articles on developments in a wide range of countries, 4-5, “Obama’s “playbook” and the threat of nuclear war in Asia,” <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/04/05/pers-a05.html>]

The Obama administration has engaged in reckless provocations against North Korea over the past month, inflaming tensions in North East Asia and heightening the risks of war. Its campaign has been accompanied by the relentless demonising of the North Korean regime and claims that the US military build-up was purely “defensive”. However, the Wall Street Journal and CNN revealed yesterday that the Pentagon was following a step-by-step plan, dubbed “the playbook”, drawn up months in advance and approved by the Obama administration earlier in the year. The flights to South Korea by nuclear capable B-52 bombers on March 8 and March 26, by B-2 bombers on March 28, and by advanced F-22 Raptor fighters on March 31 were all part of the script.¶ There is of course nothing “defensive” about B-52 and B-2 nuclear strategic bombers. The flights were designed to demonstrate, to North Korea in the first instance, the ability of the US military to conduct nuclear strikes at will anywhere in North East Asia. The Pentagon also exploited the opportunity to announce the boosting of anti-ballistic missile systems in the Asia Pacific and to station two US anti-missile destroyers off the Korean coast.¶ According to CNN, the “playbook” was drawn up by former defence secretary Leon Panetta and “supported strongly” by his replacement, Chuck Hagel. The plan was based on US intelligence assessments that “there was a low probability of a North Korean military response”—in other words, that Pyongyang posed no serious threat. Unnamed American officials claimed that Washington was now stepping back, amid concerns that the US provocations “could lead to miscalculations” by North Korea.¶ However, having deliberately ignited one of the most dangerous flashpoints in Asia, there are no signs that the Obama administration is backing off. Indeed, on Wednesday, Defence Secretary Hagel emphasised the military threat posed by North Korea, declaring that it presented “a real and clear danger”. The choice of words was deliberate and menacing—an echo of the phrase “a clear and present danger” used to justify past US wars of aggression.¶ The unstable and divided North Korean regime has played directly into the hands of Washington. Its bellicose statements and empty military threats have nothing to do with a genuine struggle against imperialism and are inimical to the interests of the international working class. Far from opposing imperialism, its Stalinist leaders are looking for a deal with the US and its allies to end their decades-long economic blockade and open up the country as a new cheap labour platform for global corporations.¶ As the present standoff shows, Pyongyang’s acquisition of a few crude nuclear weapons has in no way enhanced its defence against an American attack. The two B-2 stealth bombers that flew to South Korea could unleash enough nuclear weapons to destroy the country’s entire industrial and military capacity and murder even more than the estimated 2 million North Korean civilians killed by the three years of US war in Korea in the 1950s.¶ North Korea’s wild threats to attack American, Japanese and South Korean cities only compound the climate of fear used by the ruling classes to divide the international working class—the only social force capable of preventing war.¶ Commentators in the international media speculate endlessly on the reasons for the North Korean regime’s behaviour. But the real question, which is never asked, should be: why is the Obama administration engaged in the dangerous escalation of tensions in North East Asia? The latest US military moves go well beyond the steps taken in December 2010, when the US and South Korean navies held provocative joint exercises in water adjacent to both North Korea and China.¶ Obama’s North Korea “playbook” is just one aspect of his so-called “pivot to Asia”—a comprehensive diplomatic, economic and military strategy aimed at ensuring the continued US domination of Asia. The US has stirred up flashpoints throughout the region and created new ones, such as the conflict between Japan and China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Obama’s chief target is not economically bankrupt North Korea, but its ally China, which Washington regards as a dangerous potential rival. Driven by the deepening global economic crisis, US imperialism is using its military might to assert its hegemony over Asia and the entire planet.¶ The US has declared that its military moves against North Korea are designed to “reassure” its allies, Japan and South Korea, that it will protect them. Prominent figures in both countries have called for the development of their own nuclear weapons. US “reassurances” are aimed at heading off a nuclear arms race in North East Asia—not to secure peace, but to reinforce the American nuclear monopoly.¶ The ratcheting-up of tensions over North Korea places enormous pressures on China and the newly-selected leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. An unprecedented public debate has opened up in Beijing over whether or not to continue to support Pyongyang. The Chinese leadership has always regarded the North Korean regime as an important buffer on its northeastern borders, but now fears that the constant tension on the Korean peninsula will be exploited by the US and its allies to launch a huge military build-up.¶ Indeed, all of the Pentagon’s steps over the past month—the boosting of anti-missile systems and practice runs of nuclear capable bombers—have enhanced the ability of the US to fight a nuclear war against China. Moreover, the US may not want to provoke a war, but its provocations always run the risk of escalating dangerously out of control. Undoubtedly, Obama’s “playbook” for war in Asia contains many more steps beyond the handful leaked to the media. The Pentagon plans for all eventualities, including the possibility that a Korean crisis could bring the US and China head to head in a catastrophic nuclear conflict.

#### Arms sales increase the probability of regional conflict and leads to US-Russia-China escalation

Klare 13 (Michael Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College The Booming Global Arms Trade Is Creating a New Cold War http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/global-arms-trade-new-cold-war)

These are just some examples of recent arms deals (or ones under discussion) that suggest a fresh willingness on the part of the major powers to use weapons transfers as instruments of geopolitical intrusion and competition. The reappearance of such behavior suggests a troubling resurgence of Cold War-like rivalries. Even if senior leaders in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing are not talking about resurrecting some twenty-first-century version of the Cold War, anyone with a sense of history can see that they are headed down a grim, well-trodden path toward crisis and confrontation. What gives this an added touch of irony is that leading arms suppliers and recipients, including the United States, recently [voted](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/world/arms-trade-treaty-approved-at-un.html) in the U.N. General Assembly to approve the [Arms Trade Treaty](http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/) that was meant to impose significant constraints on the global trade in conventional weapons. Although the treaty has many loopholes, lacks an enforcement mechanism, and will require years to achieve full implementation, it represents the first genuine attempt by the international community to place real restraints on weapons sales. "This treaty won't solve the problems of Syria overnight, no treaty could do that, but it will help to prevent future Syrias," [said](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/world/arms-trade-treaty-approved-at-un.html) Anna MacDonald, the head of arms control for [Oxfam International](http://www.oxfam.org/) and an ardent treaty supporter. "It will help to reduce armed violence. It will help to reduce conflict." This may be the hope, but such expectations will quickly be crushed if the major weapons suppliers, led by the US and Russia, once again come to see arms sales as the tool of choice to gain geopolitical advantage in areas of strategic importance. Far from bringing peace and stability—as the proponents of such transactions invariably claim—each new arms deal now holds the possibility of taking us another step closer to a new Cold War with all the heightened risks of regional friction and conflict that entails. Are we, in fact, seeing a mindless new example of the old saw: that those who don't learn from history are destined to repeat it?

#### Risk of accidental exchange between the US and Russia over external crises is still high and risks extinction

**Barrett et al. 13** (Anthony M. Barrett- Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Seth D. Baum- Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University, Kelly R. Hostetler- Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University, 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia”, http://sethbaum.com/ac/fc\_NuclearWar.pdf)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1,2,3,4,5,6 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the extinction of humanity. 7,8,9,10 Nuclear war between the US and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 11,12 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve deliberate manipulation of the risk of otherwise unauthorized or inadvertent attack as part of coercive threats that “leave something to chance,” i.e., “taking steps that raise the risk that the crisis will go out of control and end in a general nuclear exchange.” 13,14 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. 15,16,17 For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 18,19,20 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 21,22 However, it has also been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 34,35,36,37,38 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 39 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 40,41,42 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 43 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 44 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 45,46,47 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 48,49 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions, 50,51,52,53 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example of such a crisis. 54,55,56,57,58 It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. 59 There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 60,61,62,63

#### China war causes extinction- even with a swift victory

Wittner 11 (11/30/11 Dr. Lawrence, Prof of History Emeritus at SUNY Albany, “Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?”)

But what would that "victory" entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a "nuclear winter" around the globe -- destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is [expected](http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-35-125.pdf) to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has [plans](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/30/nuclear-powers-weapons-spending-report) to spend hundreds of billions of dollars "modernizing" its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.

### Contention 3- Geneva Credibility

#### US human rights promotion inevitable- but the double standard created by Guantanamo prevents that promotion from being credible

Hidayat 8/21 (Syarif- editor of the Mi’raj News Agency, 2013, “GITMO PRISON SHOWS THE US HYPOCRISY AND DOUBLE STANDARDS ON HUMAN RIGHTS”, http://mirajnews.com/en/article/opinion/7121-gitmo-prison-shows-the-us-hypocrisy-and-double-standards-on-human-rights.html)

The double standards of the renowned world preacher of human rights and the hypocrisy of US imperialism’s pretense of promoting human rights on the world arena is demonstrated in Washington’s decision to maintain Guantanamo prison and torture camps. President Barack Obama had decided to give $50 million to keep Guantanamo open indefinitely in a gross violation of his election promise. President Obama promised to close Guantanamo as part of his election campaign in 2008. Islamic community leaders in the UK and the US urge Obama to stop force-feeding Gitmo detainees during Ramadan.¶ “Anywhere that human rights are under threat, the United States will proudly stand up, unabashedly, and continue to promote greater freedom, greater openness, and greater opportunity for all people. And that means speaking up when those rights are imperiled. It means providing support and training to those who are risking their lives every day so that their children can enjoy more freedom. It means engaging governments at the highest levels and pushing them to live up to their obligations to do right by their people.” - Secretary of State John Kerry, April 2013.¶ Every year, the U.S. State Department releases a report on the status of human rights in countries around the world. Every year, one country is notably missing from this report — the United States.¶ “Our world is complex and increasingly influenced by non-state actors – brave civil society activists and advocates, but also violent extremists, transnational criminals, and other malevolent actors. In those places where human rights and fundamental freedoms are denied, it is far easier for these negative destabilizing influences to take hold, threatening international stability and our own national security.”¶ “It is in our interest to promote the universal rights of all persons. Governments that respect human rights are more peaceful and more prosperous. They are better neighbors, stronger allies, and better economic partners. Governments that enforce safe workplaces, prohibit exploitative child and forced labor, and educate their citizens create a more level playing field and broader customer base for the global marketplace. Conversely, governments that threaten regional and global peace, from Iran to North Korea, are also egregious human rights abusers, with citizens trapped in the grip of domestic repression, economic deprivation, and international isolation.” ¶ “The United States stands with people and governments that aspire to freedom and democracy, mindful from our own experience that the work of building a more perfect union – a sustainable and durable democracy – will never be complete. As part of this commitment, we advocate around the world for governments to adopt policies and practices that respect human rights regardless of ethnicity, religion, gender, race, sexual orientation, or disability; that allow for and honor the results of free and fair elections; that ensure safe and healthy workplaces; and that respect peaceful protests and other forms of dissent. The United States continues to speak out unequivocally on behalf of the fundamental dignity and equality of all persons.” - Secretary of State John F. Kerry's Preface on the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012.¶ The international organization Human Rights Watch has said that the US is “hypocritical” when it criticizes other countries for violating human rights, because the situation in the US itself is far from perfect. Deputy Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch Rachel Denber criticized Obama’s administration for not investigating into cases of torture in prisons under Bush the junior and in Guantanamo prison. America’s human rights hypocrisy: The human rights record of the United States was put under an international microscope, as the UN Human Rights Council issued 228 recommendations on how Washington can address violations. America has long been the self appointed global leader on human rights, pointing out the shortcomings of others. But now the tables have turned. According to the United Nations Human Rights Council, incidents of injustice are taking place on US soil.¶ The point was made in Geneva, Switzerland at the Human Rights Council’s first comprehensive review of Washington’s record. The council released a Universal Periodic Review Tuesday, listing 228 recommendations on how the US can do better. “Close Guantanamo and secret detention centers throughout the world, punish those people who torture, disappear and execute detainees arbitrarily,” said Venezuelan delegate German Mundarain Hernan. The US has dismissed many recommendations calling them political provocations by hostile countries.¶ Yet even America’s allies are highlighting grave flaws. France and Ireland are demanding Obama follow through on the promise to close Guantanamo Bay. Britain, Belgium and dozens of others have called on the US to abolish the death penalty. For many, it’s the ultimate hypocrisy. How can a state with roughly 3,000 people on death row lecture the world about humanity? Many say the prime example is Mumia abu Jamal, viewed by some as America’s very own political prisoner.¶ “The United States, the perpetrator of gross human right violations is using human rights as a political football against its enemies. Its enemies are not enemies because they violate human rights necessarily, but because the US wants to change the government in their country,” said Brian Becker, Director of A.N.S.W.E.R Coalition in Washington, DC. The country often criticizing adversaries like Syria, Iran and North Korea for oppressing its citizens, is now faced with defending domestic practices like indefinite detention, poor prison conditions, and racial profiling.¶

#### Applying the conventions to detention policy is key to human rights credibility

Gruber 11(Aya- Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School, 1/1, “An Unintended Casualty of the War on Terror”, http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss2/12/)

As President Obama inches ever closer to embracing the “twilight zone” model of terrorism law, it would be wise to keep in mind the reputational harm the Bush administration’s war on terror caused the United States. One human rights advocate warned the Obama administration, “The results of the cases [tried in military commissions] will be suspect around the world. It is a tragic mistake to continue them.”200 More than just a source of embarrassment, there are real consequences to America’s sullied international reputation. Our experiments with “alternative” military justice not only affect our high court’s world influence, they operatively prevent the United States from assuming a leadership role in defining and defending international human rights. For example, in 2007, the Chinese government responded to the U.S. State Department’s annual human rights report by stating that America had no standing to comment on others’ human rights violations given its conduct of the war on terror. Specifically, the Chinese characterized the United States as “pointing the finger” at other nations while ignoring its “flagrant record of violating the Geneva Convention.”201 Supreme Court validation of treaty law would no doubt help repair the international reputation of the United States.202 The lesson here is about fear and missed opportunity. Guantánamo stands as a stark reminder of the great importance of international humanitarian law during times of crisis. The Geneva Conventions were the very barrier between terrorism detainees and a government regime singularly committed to national security through any means possible. Unfortunately, when international law mattered most, even the liberal Supreme Court justices avoided cementing its legal status. By contrast, Medellín, a convicted murderer, was apparently afforded the full panoply of constitutional protections, and in all likelihood, his inability to confer with consular officials did not prejudice his case. Much less was at stake, and those on the Supreme Court critical of humanitarian law impediments to waging the war on terror could fashion anti-internationalist rules with little public fanfare or liberal resistance. Consequently, although Hamdan will likely go down in history as evidence of the Court’s willingness to protect individual rights in the face of massive public fear and executive pressure, it also represents a failure to truly support the comprehensive international regime governing war-time detention, a regime in which the United States long ago vowed to participate. But all may not be lost. The Supreme Court might have another chance to rule on the status of the Geneva Conventions, and Medellín leaves some wiggle room on self-execution. If the Supreme Court is once again to be a beacon of judicial light, it must move beyond the xenophobic exceptionalism of the Bricker past and embrace the straightforward and fair principle that signed and ratified treaties are the law of the land.

#### Credible human rights frameworks solve conflict escalation

Burke-White 4 (William W., Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University The Harvard Environmental Law Review Spring, 2004 LN,<https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/wburkewh/workingpapers/17HarvHumRtsJ249(2004).pdf>)

This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period [\*250] indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security.¶ Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. n2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

#### Independently- restoring US human rights credibility over detention policy is key to increase cooperation necessary to solve terror, human trafficking, and environmental degradation

Wexler 8 (Lesley, Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law, “HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT STATEMENTS: AN IMMIGRATION CASE STUDY,” 22 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 285, Lexis)

Enhancing our reputation for human rights compliance is especially important given current political realities. Many countries hold a declining opinion of the United States.53 The international community would welcome America’s affirmation of the continuing importance of human rights in the wake of many post-September 11th actions such as torture, extraordinary rendition, increased domestic surveillance, and harsher and more frequent detention of immigrants. Moreover, the international community would benefit from the assurance that the concept of “human rights” means more than a justification for regime change.54 American exceptionalism to human rights law angers our allies and complicates efforts to secure their cooperation.55 Not surprisingly, many countries view the United States’ silence about its own human rights failings as hypocritical.56 In particular, the international community strongly criticizes the State Department’s annual human rights reports for omitting an assessment of domestic performance as well as omitting “actions by governments taken at the request of the United States or with the expressed support of the United States . . . .”57 Human rights advocates suggest that U.S. leadership on human rights faces a severe credibility gap - for instance, other countries perceive the United States as a laggard on human rights treaty compliance in regards to migrants58 - but that repudiation of past abuses and momentum for policy changes could restore its leadership.59¶ As many have suggested, good international relations are vital to winning the War on Terror.60 Moreover, international cooperation is essential to address immigration related issues such as human trafficking. A visible commitment to migrants’ human rights might bolster the United States’ credibility when it seeks better treatment for the approximately 2 million American émigrés.61 Other international problems, such as climate change and related environmental issues, also require cooperation and leadership. An increased willingness to participate in global human rights discourse and demonstrate adherence to human rights treaties might enhance our ability to lead and participate in other arenas.

#### Terrorism leads to extinction

Hellman, 08 [Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf]

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option

#### Environmental degradation risks extinction

Coyne and Hoekstra 7 (Jerry and Hopi, \*professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at the University of Chicago AND Associate Professor in the Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University, New Republic, “The Greatest Dying,” 9/24, http://www.truthout.org/article/jerry-coyne-and-hopi-e-hoekstra-the-greatest-dying)

But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that should trouble us. Healthy ecosystems the world over provide hidden services like waste disposal, nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best rendered by ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and accident, humans have introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into monoculture. Fast-growing zebra mussels, for example, have outcompeted more than 15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes and have damaged harbors and water-treatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated by single species (often genetically homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments, soils will erode and become unproductive - which, along with temperature change, will diminish agricultural yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced forest cover, ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of clean water spells disaster. In many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion. In fact, the global value of "hidden" services provided by ecosystems - those services, like waste disposal, that aren't bought and sold in the marketplace - has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per year, roughly equal to the gross domestic product of all countries combined. And that doesn't include tangible goods like fish and timber. Life as we know it would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed. Yet that is where we're heading if species extinction continues at its current pace. Extinction also has a huge impact on medicine. Who really cares if, say, a worm in the remote swamps of French Guiana goes extinct? Well, those who suffer from cardiovascular disease. The recent discovery of a rare South American leech has led to the isolation of a powerful enzyme that, unlike other anticoagulants, not only prevents blood from clotting but also dissolves existing clots. And it's not just this one species of worm: Its wriggly relatives have evolved other biomedically valuable proteins, including antistatin (a potential anticancer agent), decorsin and ornatin (platelet aggregation inhibitors), and hirudin (another anticoagulant). Plants, too, are pharmaceutical gold mines. The bark of trees, for example, has given us quinine (the first cure for malaria), taxol (a drug highly effective against ovarian and breast cancer), and aspirin. More than a quarter of the medicines on our pharmacy shelves were originally derived from plants. The sap of the Madagascar periwinkle contains more than 70 useful alkaloids, including vincristine, a powerful anticancer drug that saved the life of one of our friends. Of the roughly 250,000 plant species on Earth, fewer than 5 percent have been screened for pharmaceutical properties. Who knows what life-saving drugs remain to be discovered? Given current extinction rates, it's estimated that we're losing one valuable drug every two years. Our arguments so far have tacitly assumed that species are worth saving only in proportion to their economic value and their effects on our quality of life, an attitude that is strongly ingrained, especially in Americans. That is why conservationists always base their case on an economic calculus. But we biologists know in our hearts that there are deeper and equally compelling reasons to worry about the loss of biodiversity: namely, simple morality and intellectual values that transcend pecuniary interests. What, for example, gives us the right to destroy other creatures? And what could be more thrilling than looking around us, seeing that we are surrounded by our evolutionary cousins, and realizing that we all got here by the same simple process of natural selection? To biologists, and potentially everyone else, apprehending the genetic kinship and common origin of all species is a spiritual experience - not necessarily religious, but spiritual nonetheless, for it stirs the soul. But, whether or not one is moved by such concerns, it is certain that our future is bleak if we do nothing to stem this sixth extinction. We are creating a world in which exotic diseases flourish but natural medicinal cures are lost; a world in which carbon waste accumulates while food sources dwindle; a world of sweltering heat, failing crops, and impure water. In the end, we must accept the possibility that we ourselves are not immune to extinction. Or, if we survive, perhaps only a few of us will remain, scratching out a grubby existence on a devastated planet. Global warming will seem like a secondary problem when humanity finally faces the consequences of what we have done to nature: not just another Great Dying, but perhaps the greatest dying of them all.

### Plan

#### Plan: The United States federal judiciary should restrict the authority of the President of the United States to indefinitely detain without the Third Geneva Conventions Article Five rights.

### Contention 4- Solvency

#### Supreme Court action and application of the convention is key- solves congressional circumvention

Feldman 13 (Noah, professor of Constitutional and International Law at Harvard, “Obama Can Close Guantanamo: Here’s How,” Bloomberg, May 7, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-07/obama-has-leverage-to-get-his-way-on-guantanamo.html)

To deepen the argument beyond executive power, the president is also in charge of foreign affairs. Keeping the detainees at Guantanamo is very costly to international relations, since most nations see the prison there as a reminder of the era of waterboarding and abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Surely the president should be able to salvage the U.S.’s reputation without being held hostage by Congress?¶ The answer from Congress would have several elements. First, Congress has the power to enact a law defining who can come into the U.S., and the American public doesn’t want the detainees in the country either for trial or in a new Supermax facility. Second, Congress has the power to declare war and could conceivably assert that this should include the right to tell the president how to treat prisoners. Then there’s the power of the purse: Congress could make things difficult by declining to authorize funds for a sui table new stateside detention facility.¶ Faced with a standoff between two branches, the system allows an orderly answer: turning to the third branch, the courts, to resolve the conflict. Since 2003, the Supreme Court has taken an interest in Guantanamo, deciding on the statutory and constitutional rights extended there, and vetting procedures for detainee hearings and trials. Along the way, it has shown an equal-opportunity willingness to second-guess the executive -- as when President George W. Bush denied hearings to detainees -- and Congress, which passed a law denying habeas corpus to the prisoners.¶ How could the court get involved? The first step would be for the Obama administration to show some of the legal self-confidence it did in justifying drone strikes against U.S. citizens or in ignoring the War Powers Resolution in the Libya military intervention. Likewise, it could assert a right of control over where the detainees should be held. And if the president’s lawyers are worried about Bush-style assertions of plenary executive power (which, for the record, didn’t concern them when it came to drones or Libya), there is a path they could follow that would hew closer to their favored constitutional style.¶ Geneva Conventions¶ The reasoning could look like this: The president’s war power must be exercised pursuant to the laws of war embodied in the Geneva Conventions. And though Guantanamo once conformed to those laws -- as the administration asserted in 2009 -- it no longer does. The conditions are too makeshift to manage the continuing prisoner resistance, and indefinite detention in an indefinite war with no enemy capable of surrendering is pressing on the bounds of lawful POW detention.¶ Congress doesn’t have the authority to force the president to violate the laws of war. Yet by blocking Obama from closing Guantanamo, that is just what Congress is doing. What’s more, he has the inherent authority to ensure that we are complying with our treaty obligations.

#### Citations on article 3 and 75 should have triggered the link to your DA’s

Tony Ginsburg et al\* 9, law prof at Chicago, “brief of international law experts as amici curiae in support of petitioners”, <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1234_PetitionerAmCuIntlLawExperts.authcheckdam.pdf>

\*Ryan Goodman is Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law Professor of Politics and Sociology and Co-Chair of the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at NYU School of Law. Oona Hathaway is Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law at Yale Law School. Jennifer Martinez is Professor of Law and Justin M. Roach, Jr. Faculty Scholar at Stanford Law School. Steven R. Ratner is Bruno Simma Collegiate Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. Kal Raustiala is Professor at UCLA School of Law and UCLA International Institute and Director of the UCLA Ronald W. Burkle Center for International Relations. Beth Van Schaack is Associate Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law and a Visiting Scholar with the Center on Democracy, Development & The Rule of Law at Stanford University. David Scheffer is Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law and Director of the Center for International Human Rights. James Silk is Clinical Professor of Law at Yale Law School, where he directs the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic. He is also executive director of the Law School’s Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights. David Sloss is Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Global Law and Policy at Santa Clara University School of Law.

The law of war creates an independent legal obligation that the District Court be permitted to order Petitioners’ release. The law of war does not displace the obligations under the Covenant outlined above, but creates an additional international legal obligation on the United States to permit the District Court to order Petitioners’ release.10 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which the United States has ratified, requires that detainees be treated humanely. This principle is appropriately interpreted in light of recognized customary international law that requires the release of detainees when the reason for their detention has ceased. In the case at hand, the District Court must have the authority to order the release of Petitioners, whose detention is unlawful and who pose no threat to the United States.¶ Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions – often called Common Article 3 because it appears in all four of the Geneva Conventions – requires that all persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including detainees, be “treated humanely.” Common Article 3, supra. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006), the Supreme Court held that Common Article 3 is legally binding on the United States and enforceable in U.S. courts.11 Common Article 3 provides that in a “conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,” certain provisions. Common Article 3, supra. Among these provisions is the requirement that “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including . . . those placed hors de combat by . . . detention . . . shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.” Id. (second emphasis added).¶ The obligation that detained civilians be “treated humanely” must be read in light of Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, see Article 75, supra. Article 75, which is “indisputably part of the customary international law,” 548 U.S. at 634 (plurality opinion),12 provides that all detainees held in connection with armed conflict “shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist.” Article 75, supra, § 3 (emphasis added).13¶ Although the United States has not ratified Protocol I, the Protocol’s status as customary international law renders it an appropriate interpretive tool for the Court. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 633 (plurality opinion) (noting that Common Article 3 “must be understood to incorporate at least the barest of those trial protections that have been recognized by customary international law,” many of which are “described in Article 75 of Protocol I”). Under Article 75, civilians initially detained because they were thought to pose a security risk must be released as soon as it is clear that they pose no such risk. This reading of Common Article 3 in light of Article 75 is consistent with the conclusions of a 2005 study on Customary International Humanitarian Law by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which concludes that as a matter of treaty law, “arbitrary deprivation of liberty is not compatible” with humane treatment under Common Article 3. See Int’l Comm. Red Cross, I Customary International Humanitarian Law 344 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise DoswaldBeck eds., 2007).¶ State Department Legal Advisers have repeatedly stated that the fundamental guarantees expressed in Article 75 are part of the law of war.14¶ While serving as Legal Adviser to President George W. Bush, William H. Taft, IV wrote that the “customary law notion of fundamental guarantees found more expansive expression in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions” and that the United States “does regard the provisions of Article 75 as an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled.” William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 Yale J. Int’l L. 319, 321-22 (2003). His successor, John Bellinger, argued for a public statement recognizing Article 75 as customary international law binding on the United States, noting in the process that U.S. practice conforms to Article 75. See Letter from John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 16, 2008) (on file with the Yale Law School Library). These Legal Advisers were reaffirming a position declared more than two decades ago under then-Deputy Legal Adviser Michael Matheson. See Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 419, 427 (1987) (“We support in particular the fundamental guarantees contained in article 75. . . .”). It is therefore appropriate to interpret the binding legal obligations on the United States under Common Article 3 in light of Article 75’s obligation to release detainees as soon as the reason for their detention has ceased.¶ The United States’ obligation under Common Article 3 to ensure the courts have the authority to order release of detainees when there is no lawful basis for detention can be enforced by this Court through the habeas statute. Section 2241 expressly provides that habeas relief is available where detention is contrary to U.S. treaty obligations. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006) (noting that writ extends to prisoners held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”); see Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail, 120 U.S. 1, 17 (1887) (holding that because a “treaty is part of the supreme law of the United States,” the power to issue writs of habeas corpus applies to prisoners held in violation of treaties). At a minimum, Common Article 3 should be used to interpret the domestic habeas corpus statute. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).

#### No executive circumvention

Bradley and Morrison 13 (Curtis, Professor of Law, Duke Law School, and Trevor, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School , “Presidential Power, Historical Practice, And

Legal Constraint” Duke Law Scholarship Repository) http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5451&context=faculty\_scholarship

Insisting on a sharp distinction between the law governing presidential authority that is subject to judicial review and the law that is not also takes for granted a phenomenon that merits attention—that Presidents follow judicial decisions.118 That assumption is generally accurate in the United States today. To take one relatively recent example, despite disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s determination in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the war on terror, the Bush Administration quickly accepted it.119 But the reason why Presidents abide by court decisions has a connection to the broader issue of the constraining effect of law. An executive obligation to comply with judicial decisions is itself part of the practice-based constitutional law of the United States, so presidential compliance with this obligation may demonstrate that such law can in fact constrain the President. This is true, as we explain further in Part III, even if the effect on presidential behavior is motivated by concerns about external political perceptions rather than an internal sense of fidelity to law (or judicial review).120

#### Our mech is key – empirics are irrelevant

Bradely 10 (Curtis is the William Van Alstyne Professor of Law, Professor of Public Policy Studies, and Senior Associate Dean for Faculty & Research at the Duke University School of Law, “CLEAR STATEMENT RULES AND¶ EXECUTIVE WAR POWERS”, http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/bradley.pdf)

The Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush4 might seem an¶ aberration in this regard, but it is not. Although the Court in¶ Boumediene did rely on the Constitution in holding that the detainees¶ at Guantanamo have a right to seek habeas corpus review¶ in U.S. courts, it did not impose any specific restrictions¶ on the executive’s detention, treatment, or trial of the detain‐ees.5 In other words, Boumediene was more about preserving a¶ role for the courts than about prohibiting the executive from¶ exercising statutorily conferred authority.

# 2AC

## Afghan

### 2AC NATO Mod

#### Blank says early withdrawal crushes NATO- causes great power war

Brzezinski ‘9 (Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. National Security Adviser from 1977 to 1981. His most recent book is Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower, September 2009 - October 2009, (Foreign Affairs, SECTION: Pg. 2 Vol. 88 No. 5, HEADLINE: An Agenda for NATO Subtitle: Toward a Global Security Web, p. Lexis, 2009)

ADJUSTING TO A TRANSFORMED WORLD And yet, it is fair to ask: Is NATO living up to its extraordinary potential? NATO today is without a doubt the most powerful military and political alliance in the world. Its 28 members come from the globe's two most productive, technologically advanced, socially modern, economically prosperous, and politically democratic regions. Its member states' 900 million people account for only 13 percent of the world's population but 45 percent of global GDP. NATO's potential is not primarily military. Although NATO is a collective-security alliance, its actual military power comes predominantly from the United States, and that reality is not likely to change anytime soon. NATO's real power derives from the fact that it combines the United States' military capabilities and economic power with Europe's collective political and economic weight (and occasionally some limited European military forces). Together, that combination makes NATO globally significant. It must therefore remain sensitive to the importance of safeguarding the geopolitical bond between the United States and Europe as it addresses new tasks. The basic challenge that NATO now confronts is that there are historically unprecedented risks to global security. Today's world is threatened neither by the militant fanaticism of a territorially rapacious nationalist state nor by the coercive aspiration of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansive imperial power. The paradox of our time is that the world, increasingly connected and economically interdependent for the first time in its entire history, is experiencing intensifying popular unrest made all the more menacing by the growing accessibility of weapons of mass destruction -- not just to states but also, potentially, to extremist religious and political movements. Yet there is no effective global security mechanism for coping with the growing threat of violent political chaos stemming from humanity's recent political awakening. The three great political contests of the twentieth century (the two world wars and the Cold War) accelerated the political awakening of mankind, which was initially unleashed in Europe by the French Revolution. Within a century of that revolution, spontaneous populist political activism had spread from Europe to East Asia. On their return home after World Wars I and II, the South Asians and the North Africans who had been conscripted by the British and French imperial armies propagated a new awareness of anticolonial nationalist and religious political identity among hitherto passive and pliant populations. The spread of literacy during the twentieth century and the wide-ranging impact of radio, television, and the Internet accelerated and intensified this mass global political awakening. In its early stages, such new political awareness tends to be expressed as a fanatical embrace of the most extreme ethnic or fundamentalist religious passions, with beliefs and resentments universalized in Manichaean categories. Unfortunately, in significant parts of the developing world, bitter memories of European colonialism and of more recent U.S. intrusion have given such newly aroused passions a distinctively anti-Western cast. Today, the most acute example of this phenomenon is found in an area that stretches from Egypt to India. This area, inhabited by more than 500 million politically and religiously aroused peoples, is where NATO is becoming more deeply embroiled. Additionally complicating is the fact that the dramatic rise of China and India and the quick recovery of Japan within the last 50 years have signaled that the global center of political and economic gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific. And of the currently leading global powers -- the United States, the EU, China, Japan, Russia, and India -- at least two, or perhaps even three, are revisionist in their orientation. Whether they are "rising peacefully" (a self-confident China), truculently (an imperially nostalgic Russia) or boastfully (an assertive India, despite its internal multiethnic and religious vulnerabilities), they all desire a change in the global pecking order. The future conduct of and relationship among these three still relatively cautious revisionist powers will further intensify the strategic uncertainty. Visible on the horizon but not as powerful are the emerging regional rebels, with some of them defiantly reaching for nuclear weapons. North Korea has openly flouted the international community by producing (apparently successfully) its own nuclear weapons -- and also by profiting from their dissemination. At some point, its unpredictability could precipitate the first use of nuclear weapons in anger since 1945. Iran, in contrast, has proclaimed that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes but so far has been unwilling to consider consensual arrangements with the international community that would provide credible assurances regarding these intentions. In nuclear-armed Pakistan, an extremist anti-Western religious movement is threatening the country's political stability. These changes together reflect the waning of the post-World War II global hierarchy and the simultaneous dispersal of global power. Unfortunately, U.S. leadership in recent years unintentionally, but most unwisely, contributed to the currently threatening state of affairs. The combination of Washington's arrogant unilateralism in Iraq and its demagogic Islamophobic sloganeering weakened the unity of NATO and focused aroused Muslim resentments on the United States and the West more generally

## T

### 2AC T

#### 2) we only rule on article five- their violation is based on article 11 they are different- here’s article five text in case you where wondering:

<http://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/375-590008?OpenDocument>

The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 [ Link ] from the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release and repatriation.

Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4 [ Link ] , such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.

#### Counter-interpretation- indefinite detention is detaining an arrested person without trail that’s a quote from

US LEGAL 13 (<http://definitions.uslegal.com/i/indefinite-detention/>, “Indefinite Detention”)

Indefinite detention is the practice of detaining an arrested person by a national government or law enforcement agency without a trial. It may be made by the home country or by a foreign nation. Indefinite detention is a controversial practice, especially in situations where the detention is by a foreign nation. It is controversial because it seema to violate many national and international laws. It also violates human rights laws.

## NMS

### 2AC NMS CP

#### Should doesn’t mean unconditional

Atlas Collaboration 99 [ATD, Jan. 24, <http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html>]

**'shall' describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement \_will\_ be satisfied without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it must be rejected under these circumstances. Examples: "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is mandatory." This is a good example. "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong. should 'should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the better.**

#### “Resolved” is a formal resolution made by a deliberative body --- means it’s just a formality the topic committee sustains from year to year

American Heritage Dictionary 2k

Resolved – v. A formal resolution made by a deliberative body.

#### Has to be codified to solve

Gregory Shaffer 11, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, and Mark Pollack, Professor of Political Science and Jean Monnet Chair, Temple University., Sept, ARTICLE: HARD VERSUS SOFT LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 52 B.C. L. Rev 1147

To effect specific policy goals, state and private actors increasingly turn to legal instruments that are harder or softer in manners that best align with such proposals. n79 These variations in precision, obligation, and third-party delegation can be used strategically to advance both international and domestic policy goals. Much of the existing literature examines the relative strengths and weaknesses of hard and soft law for the states that make it. It is important, for our purposes, to address these purported advantages in order to assess the implications of the interaction of hard and soft law on each other.¶ Hard law as an institutional form features a number of advantages. n80 Hard law instruments, for example, allow states to commit themselves more credibly to international agreements by increasing the costs of reneging. They do so by imposing legal sanctions or by raising the costs to a state's reputation where the state has acted in violation of its legal commitments. n81 In addition, hard law treaties may have the advantage of creating direct legal effects in national jurisdictions, again increasing the incentives for compliance. n82 They may solve problems of incomplete contracting by creating mechanisms for the interpretation and elaboration of legal commitments over time, n83 including through the use of dispute settlement bodies such as courts. n84 In different ways, they thus permit states to monitor, clarify, and enforce their commitments. Hard law, as a result, can create more legal certainty. States, as well as private actors working with and through state representatives, [\*1163] should use hard law where "the benefits of cooperation are great but the potential for opportunism and its costs are high." n85

#### CP tips the balance too far and collapses CMR --- the military should take an active role over tactical decisions, not broad political ones

Desch 7 (Michael C., Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-making at the George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service – Texas A&M University, “Bush and the Generals”, Foreign Affairs, May/June, Lexis)

Defense Secretary Gates now faces a doubly difficult situation: little real progress has been made in transforming the U.S. military, and it is now embroiled in a conflict that not even he is optimistic about. Worse, he has to address these problems in a climate of distinct frostiness between civilians in the Bush administration and senior military leaders. Former Secretary of the Army White, summarizing the Bush and Rumsfeld legacy, noted, "By definition, [secretaries of defense] are civilians. Some of them might have had experiences in their younger years in the military, but their job, among other things, is to take the wise advice offered them by the military and think that over and give it some credence and then make a decision. The question is, have we lost the balance of that? I think they went too far." Gates' key challenge, therefore, is to reestablish that civil-military balance. To be sure, Gates cannot and should not abdicate his responsibility to exercise civilian control of the military. In a democratic political system, decisions about war and peace should be made not by soldiers but by voters through their elected leaders. At the same time, however, Gates should encourage, rather than stifle, candid advice from the senior military leadership, even if it does not support administration policy. The military has a right and a duty to be heard. After all, soldiers are the experts in fighting wars -- and it is their lives that are ultimately on the line. If senior officers feel that their advice is being ignored or that they are being asked to carry out immoral orders, they should resign. Indeed, had Shinseki or Newbold resigned in the run-up to the Iraq war, he would have sent a powerful message about the military's reservations about the war -- one far more effective than protests after the fact. Threats of resignations among the Joint Chiefs may be influencing the Bush administration's Iran policy (including derailing plans to use nuclear weapons against hardened Iranian nuclear installations). Barring such extremely serious reservations, after senior military officers have had their say, they should salute and obey. Ironically, General David Petraeus, the recently appointed commander of U.S.-led forces in Iraq, has in the past written of the failure of the senior military leadership to talk straight about the Vietnam War and its impact on subsequent U.S. civil-military relations. Petraeus is himself now in a position to advise both the administration and the new Democratic-controlled Congress. In his confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Petraeus promised that he would give his "best professional military advice, and if people don't like it, then they can find someone else to give better professional military advice." Hopefully, he will speak candidly -- and Gates will listen. The proper balance would give civilian leaders authority over political decisions -- such was whether the United States should stay in Iraq or use force against Iran -- and the military wide leeway in making the operational and tactical decisions about how to complete a mission. The line between the two realms is not always perfectly clear, and sometimes military considerations affect political decisions, and vice versa. But the alternative -- civilians meddling in matters of military expertise -- is almost as bad as the military involving itself in politics. Whenever the civil-military balance is off-kilter in either direction, the country suffers as a result.

### Water Wars

#### Credible human rights promotion allows for cooperation that solves water wars- convention ruling is key

Varma, 13 (Director of Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, 9/9, “Wòch nan soley: The denial of the right to water in Haiti,” http://www.hhrjournal.org/2013/09/09/woch-nan-soley-the-denial-of-the-right-to-water-in-haiti/)

In addition to protections in domestic law, **the right to water is** also **recognized in international** **law**. International and regional human rights bodies and national and international courts have interpreted the right to water as being an implicit part of other human rights, such as the right to life, the right to health, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to food, the right to housing, and the right to education.117 These rights have **been enshrined in** both UN and regional **human rights instruments**, several of which have been **ratified by** Haiti and the United States. Both Haiti and the United States have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which protects, inter alia, the right to life. Both have signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which includes, inter alia, the right to housing, food, health, and an adequate standard of living.118 The right to water is also protected under other international instruments. These instruments are useful indicators of norms accepted by the international community and reflect evidence of political will to make access to water a priority. The provisions in some international instruments have obtained the status of customary international law and thus create legal obligations for states. Customary international law is derived from a clear consensus among states as to a legal rule, which is evidenced by widespread conduct by states accompanied by a sense of legal obligation to adhere to such rule, known as opinio juris.119 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) has found that the minimum core of the main economic, social, and cultural rights has become customary international law and is thus binding on all states, regardless of whether they have signed or ratified treaties protecting those rights. Many scholars support this position.120 The right to life is further protected by customary international law, and as a necessary component of the right to life, the right to water is thus implicitly protected by customary international law.121 International instruments that may reflect customary international law and that protect the right to water, either explicitly or implicitly, include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration on the Right to Development, and the Millennium Development Goals.122 States’ treaty-based obligations to secure Haitians’ right to water As the situation in Haiti makes clear, **legal rights provide no real protection for individuals without corresponding responsibilities, and the responsibility for fulfilling rights is an integral part of all legal rights**. Generally, the government of each state bears the primary responsibility to ensure the protection and achievement of human rights for those on its territory or otherwise under its jurisdiction. A state’s human rights obligations also apply when it acts as part of a multilateral or international organization, such as the UN or the World Bank.123 Thus, members of the international community bear a measure of legal responsibility. The case of water in Haiti is **directly relevant to the issue of international human rights law as codified in treaties** and under customary international law. When a state signs a treaty, the state is required to refrain from any action that would contradict the object and purpose of the treaty, and when a state ratifies a treaty, the state thereby accepts the duties contained within the treaty and is required to immediately take positive steps to realize the rights contained in the treaty.124 Even if a state has neither signed nor ratified a human rights treaty, it has certain obligations under customary international law, which protects fundamental human rights and in general applies to all states. Types of duties Human rights treaties generally specify three different kinds of duties relating to the rights set out in the treaty. The first is the obligation to respect, meaning that governments must refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with an individual’s enjoyment of rights. The second is the obligation to protect, meaning that governments must prevent the violation of human rights by other actors. States’ actions to protect include actions that prevent individuals, companies, or other entities from violating individuals’ human rights, and also actions to investigate and punish such violations if they occur. And the third duty is the obligation to fulfill, meaning that governments must adopt whatever measures are necessary to achieve the full realization of human rights for all. Thus, governments are required to provide subsidies, services, or other direct assistance to the most vulnerable and needy members of a society when they cannot otherwise access their rights. Obligations of the government of Haiti In accordance with these treaty-based obligations and customary international law, the Haitian government is responsible for guaranteeing and fulfilling the human rights of everyone in Haiti.125 Haiti is a party to the ICCPR, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter, and the American Convention on Human Rights; it is thus responsible for all the obligations found within each of these treaties. The Haitian government has signed, but not yet ratified, the ICESCR and the Protocol of San Salvador, both of which enumerate many of the rights at issue in this article; thus, these treaties do not strictly bind the government of Haiti. However, as a signatory, Haiti has an obligation to refrain from actions that will frustrate the object and purpose of these treaties.126 Furthermore, given that the Haitian Constitution protects the rights to health and food, the Haitian government has an obligation to ensure the satisfaction of — at the very least — minimum essential levels of each of these rights, of which access to water is an integral component. All Haitians, as rights-holders, have a particular set of entitlements, and the Haitian state, as the primary duty-bearer, has a particular set of obligations. Haitians who cannot access even the most basic forms of these entitlements are being deprived of their constitutional economic and social rights and their rights under treaties guaranteeing basic civil and political rights, such as the right to life, personal liberty, and security.127 The Haitian Constitution requires the Haitian government to recognize and protect Haitians’ rights to health, decent housing, education, and food.128 Because the right to water is an important component of these rights, the Haitian government has a responsibility to ensure the full realization of the right to water through national legislation and policies. A national water strategy should elaborate how the right to water is to be realized and should include concrete goals, policies, and a time frame for implementation.129 Obligations of the international community While the government of Haiti is the primary guarantor of Haitians’ rights, the international community also has obligations.130 Human rights treaty obligations apply not only within the territory of the ratifying state, but also apply to states’ behavior outside of their borders, through the concept of jurisdiction, and to states’ actions as members of the international community.131 This means that states must protect the human rights of all individuals within their territory or under their jurisdiction and **ensure that their actions at the international level are in compliance with their human rights obligations**.132 With respect to the right to water, this means that states must “refrain from actions that interfere, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to water in other countries.”133 The following brief summary of international obligations relevant to Haiti illustrates the importance of this factor in discussing Haitians’ right to water. Two types of state action are most pertinent to the denial of the right to water in Haiti: 1) when states act individually on the international level, and 2) when they act as members of international organizations, particularly international financial institutions (IFIs). The Maastricht Guidelines, developed to clarify which state actions constitute violations of economic, social, and cultural rights, assert that states’ duties to protect human rights extend to their “participation in international organizations, where they act collectively.”134 When authorized by member states, IFIs can take actions that may help fulfill human rights, such as financing the construction of the infrastructure needed to deliver and treat water. Alternatively, actions by IFIs may hinder the enjoyment of human rights, through, for example, requiring governments to minimize social programs or privatize core services as a precondition to receipt of grants or loans. IFI actions in such cases may interfere with the target state’s ability to fulfill human rights obligations.135 To effectively ensure the realization of the right to water, member states must be held accountable for the actions that they take, through IFIs, that have a direct impact on the human rights of individuals located outside their territory.136 At a minimum, member states must abide by their duty to respect human rights in their actions as members of IFIs.137 The ESCR Committee — responsible for interpreting and monitoring compliance with the ICESCR — has determined that states are bound by human rights obligations when acting as members of IFIs.138 With regard to the right to water, the Committee notes that “States parties that are members of international financial institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and regional development banks, should take steps to ensure that the right to water is taken into account in their lending policies, credit agreements and other international measures.”139 This statement further stipulates that “water should never be used as an instrument of political and economic pressure.”140 The majority of members of the World Bank Group and IMF (including the United States) are party to the ICCPR, which can be **seen as providing protections of the right to water as an element of the right to life, a right central to the ICCPR**.141 Also, since the ICESCR has been ratified by the majority of major IFI state members and all European Union countries, these states are obligated to comply with its provisions. The United States has not ratified the ICESCR, but it has signed the treaty, and thus must refrain from acting in a manner that would frustrate the object and purpose of the treaty.142 Many IDB member states are also members of the OAS, through which states may ratify regional treaties, including the American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador, that protect economic and social rights. Moreover, the minimum core content of the key economic and social rights is regarded as customary international law, binding even non-ratifying states such as the United States. Thus, the action taken by the United States in blocking IDB development loans earmarked for water projects in Haiti is a **direct violation of** the **U**nited **S**tates’ **human rights obligations**.143 In this case, the United States actively impeded the Haitian state’s ability to fulfill Haitians’ human right to water through its actions, breaching its duty to respect. Such blatant frustration of the object and purpose of the human rights treaties to which the United States is a signatory or a state party is a clear violation of international law. Recommendation: Adopt a rights-based approach This article has documented the disastrous consequences of the IDB’s extended failure to disburse loans earmarked for water projects in Haiti. It has demonstrated how these actions directly impeded the Haitian government’s ability to respect, protect, and fulfill its citizens’ right to water. While the government of Haiti is primarily responsible for ensuring this right, other key actors, such as IFIs, foreign states, nongovernmental organizations, and private companies also have a role in solving Haiti’s water crisis. To ensure a sustainable solution, we recommend that all of these actors, in addition to the Haitian government, adopt a rights-based approach to the development and implementation of water projects. Such an approach would enhance the Haitian government’s ability to deliver these services and the Haitian population’s right to access safe and sufficient water. This section provides a brief explanation of a rights-based approach to development and its implications for water security in Haiti. A rights-based approach A rights-based approach to development is a conceptual framework that is based on international human rights law and methodology.144 It integrates the norms, standards, and principles of international human rights law into the plans, policies, and processes of development. A rights-based approach to development is based on five principles. First, a human rights-based approach shifts the language of development from charity to empowerment, viewing the beneficiary of development assistance as the owner of a right. The duty-bearer has a responsibility to develop access to the relevant rights to the rights-holder. Second, a rights-based approach considers the indivisibility and interdependence of interrelated rights (civil, cultural, economic, political, and social), recognizing that a policy affecting one right will necessarily have an impact on the others.145 Third, a rights-based approach requires non-discrimination and attention to vulnerable groups; that is, groups historically excluded from the political process and prohibited access to basic services must receive particular attention. Fourth, a rights-based approach to development ceases to be about charity and instead is about duty-bearers’ accountability to human rights obligations. In this case, accountability falls primarily on the government of Haiti, but also on the actions of donor states and private actors (for example, those providing public services) as they have obligations in particular situations. Transparency is crucial to increasing accountability.146 Finally, a rights-based approach requires duty-bearers to ensure a high degree of participation from communities, civil society, minorities, indigenous peoples, women, and other marginalized groups. Such participation must be active, free, and meaningful and must occur at each level of the development process.147 Measures to address and reduce structural participation inequalities or disadvantages may require appropriate preferential treatment to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Transparency is, again, essential. A rights-based approach to water projects in Haiti A rights-based approach to developing the water sector in Haiti requires all actors to incorporate each of these principles into their work. For example, effective participation requires that community members be involved in all efforts to improve the water situation. They should be consulted during the development of water projects, especially on issues such as water source, availability, sanitation precautions, time frames for implementation, water cost, and water quality. There must be regular consultations with the community during project development. Community members must have easy access to ongoing project information during implementation — for example, via posters, meetings, and radio programs. Such participation would help to ensure that water projects are empowering the Haitian people as rights-holders and that the projects are adequately and accurately meeting their needs. A rights-based approach also requires transparency of all efforts and actors involved in developing and implementing water projects in Haiti. There are several means to achieving this transparency. For example, since the government does not yet have the capacity to effectively regulate the private sector, groups responsible for water distribution or sale should also be responsible for regularly checking the safety of sources used for drinking water and publicizing test results. In addition, all water providers should report regularly on the status of projects, providing, at a minimum, information about available project funds, monies spent, specific timelines for implementation and completion, and any changes to original implementation plans. International entities might include mechanisms for transparency in their work in Haiti by providing readily-available public documentation of project status, including expenditures. Finally, a rights-based approach requires that each implementing entity has a clear and accessible accountability mechanism (or mechanisms) through which communities can report project problems. In Haiti’s case, this should include mechanisms for redress from all actors, including international organizations, states, IFIs, NGOs, and private entities. These mechanisms need to be locally focused and easily accessible, and they should have built-in transparency so that community members can follow the status of grievances or complaints and keep the public aware of their outcomes. Accountability also lies with the government, which should build internal accountability mechanisms into its national water strategy, with identifying benchmarks to measure the extent to which the right to water is being realized. The right to water has been compromised in Haiti for too long. **A rights-based approach is an essential strategy in the successful implementation and monitoring of** sustainable development projects, including **water projects**. While the government of Haiti is obligated to implement a rights-based approach, all entities involved in the development and implementation of water projects can contribute to fulfilling Haitians’ human rights by adopting this framework.

#### Outweighs their impacts- guarantees extinction

Barlow 8—National chairperson of The Council of Canadians. Co-founder of the Blue Planet Project. Chairs the board of Washington-based Food & Water Watch and is also an executive member of the San Francisco–based International Forum on Globalization and a Councillor with the Hamburg-based World Future Council. She is the recipient of eight honorary doctorates. Served as Senior Advisor on Water to the 63rd President of the United Nations General Assembly (Maude, The Global Water Crisis and the Coming Battle for the Right to Water, 25 February 2008, http://www.fpif.org/articles/the\_global\_water\_crisis\_and\_the\_coming\_battle\_for\_the\_right\_to\_water)

The three water crises – dwindling freshwater supplies, inequitable access to water and the corporate control of water – pose the greatest threat of our time to the planet and to our survival. Together with impending climate change from fossil fuel emissions, the water crises impose some life-or-death decisions on us all. Unless we collectively change our behavior, we are heading toward a world of deepening conflict and potential wars over the dwindling supplies of freshwater – between nations, between rich and poor, between the public and the private interest, between rural and urban populations, and between the competing needs of the natural world and industrialized humans. Water Is Becoming a Growing Source of Conflict Between Countries Around the world, more that 215 major rivers and 300 groundwater basins and aquifers are shared by two or more countries, creating tensions over ownership and use of the precious waters they contain. Growing shortages and unequal distribution of water are causing disagreements, sometimes violent, and becoming a security risk in many regions. Britain’s former defense secretary, John Reid, warns of coming “water wars.” In a public statement on the eve of a 2006 summit on climate change, Reid predicted that violence and political conflict would become more likely as watersheds turn to deserts, glaciers melt and water supplies are poisoned. He went so far as to say that the global water crisis was becoming a global security issue and that Britain’s armed forces should be prepared to tackle conflicts, including warfare, over dwindling water sources. “Such changes make the emergence of violent conflict more, rather than less, likely,” former British prime minister Tony Blair told The Independent. “The blunt truth is that the lack of water and agricultural land is a significant contributory factor to the tragic conflict we see unfolding in Darfur. We should see this as a warning sign.” The Independent gave several other examples of regions of potential conflict. These include Israel, Jordan and Palestine, who all rely on the Jordan River, which is controlled by Israel; Turkey and Syria, where Turkish plans to build dams on the Euphrates River brought the country to the brink of war with Syria in 1998, and where Syria now accuses Turkey of deliberately meddling with its water supply; China and India, where the Brahmaputra River has caused tension between the two countries in the past, and where China’s proposal to divert the river is re-igniting the divisions; Angola, Botswana and Namibia, where disputes over the Okavango water basin that have flared in the past are now threatening to re-ignite as Namibia is proposing to build a threehundred- kilometer pipeline that will drain the delta; Ethiopia and Egypt, where population growth is threatening conflict along the Nile; and Bangladesh and India, where flooding in the Ganges caused by melting glaciers in the Himalayas is wreaking havoc in Bangladesh, leading to a rise in illegal, and unpopular, migration to India.

## K

### 2AC Alt Doesn’t Solve Aff

#### Alt doesn’t solve detention- there is a trade-off between their method and Geneva endorsement- and our method solves best

Jenks 11 (INDEFINITE DETENTION UNDER THE LAWS OF WAR Chris Jenks\* & Eric Talbot Jensen\*\* Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps. Presently serving as the Chief of the International Law Branch, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Washington D.C. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and not The Judge Advocate General's Corps, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense. \*\* Visiting Assistant Professor, Fordham Law School. The authors wish to thank Sue Ann Johnson for her exceptional research and editing skills, and the organizers and attendees at both the 3rd Annual National Security Law Jtinior Faculty Workshop at the University of Texas School of Law, where we first discussed the ideas for this article, and the Stanford Law and Policy Review National Defense Symposium, where we first presented the finished product. STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 22:1] Page Lexis)

Those who would deconstruct the law of war as applied to detention stemming from armed conflict with non state actors may achieve victory, but in an academic, and, practically speaking, pyrrhic sense. Arguing that the Geneva Conventions for Prisoners and Civilians do not, on their face, apply to members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban may be correct, and in more than one way. But in so arguing, the deconstructionist approach removes a large portion of intemationally recognized and accepted provisions for regulating detention associated with armed conflict—^the Geneva Conventions—^while leaving the underlying question of how to govern detention unanswered. At some point, even the deconstructionist must shift to positivism and propose an alternative, an alternative we submit would inevitably resemble that which is already extant in the law of war. Moreover, while there has been discussion about the strained application of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols to states combating transnational terrorism, attempts at a new convention have gained little traction. Our approach is more an attempt at pragmatism than radicalism—there are individuals currently detained, purportedly indefinitely and under the law of war. Yet despite years of such detention, two administrations have provided little if any information on what exactly such detention means, how and by what it is govemed, and if and how it ends. Conflating aspects of internationally recognized law of war conventions allows for a transparent process that could be promulgated now. Whether for the up to fifty or so individuals currently detained at Guantanamo or for those who may be detained in the future, we posit that the law of war provides a legitimate model for indefinite detention. And, as the Walsh Report recognized,^' the longer detainees are held, the more concern for their individual situations must be given. We therefore analyze the complete protections provided by the law of war and advocate that all of them, over time and to varying degrees, be applied to the detainees in Guantanamo. In this way, detention under the laws of war can provide a humane system of indefinite detention that strikes the right balance between the security of the nation and the rights of individuals

### 2AC Pos Peace

#### Crisis politics is good—key to foreign policy analysis

Eric K. Stern 2003 Associate Professor of Government at Uppsala University, Director of the Center for Crisis Management Research and Training, Swedish National Defense College, senior research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (International Studies Review (2003) 5, 155–202, Crisis Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis: Insights, Synergies, and Challenges)

For good and ill, the development of foreign policy analysis has been and will continue to be intimately linked to the phenomenon of crisis in both domestic and international politics. The problem of coping with crisis exerts a strong gravitational pull on scholars and practitioners alike for good political and psychological reasons. Crises are consequential, dramatic, vivid, and emotionally charged. They are moments or periods of truth in which the mettle of leaders and the robustness of institutions are tested and frailties are quickly revealed to colleagues, journalists, and citizens. Crises tend to capture the attention of leaders and scholars alike, sometimes to the neglect of other fundamental but less thrilling aspects of national and international politics. Events such as the Korean Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Energy Crises of the mid-1970s, Chernobyl, the Gulf War, Mad Cow Disease, and September 11, 2001, demand our attention and cast long political and intellectual shadows (Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001). Crises provide opportunities for leadership that are not only exploited by policy practitioners but by scholars as well. In the personal computer industry, it has become commonplace for strategists to use the term ‘‘the killer application’’ to refer to a software product that becomes a vehicle for launching a new technological platform. Major crises have often served as such killer applications in the scholarly community, providing compelling empirical demonstrations of theoretical or metatheoretical arguments. Glen Paige’s (1968) study of the Korean Crisis became an important exemplar, showing how Richard Snyder and his associates’ (1962) foreign policy decision-making framework could be used as a basis for theoretically driven empirical research. Other good examples include Yuen Foong Khong’s (1992) use of the Vietnam crisis of 1965 to launch his theoretical framework for the analysis of the impact of historical analogy on foreign policymaking, and Barbara Farnham’s (1997) employment of the Munich Crisis as a means of showcasing her political decision-making approach. Graham Allison’s (1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999) The Essence of Decision, which was examined by Jean Garrison in her essay in this symposium, cleverly used the Cuban Missile Crisis - one of the great political thrillers of the twentieth Century - as a launching pad to make a number of metatheoretical, theoretical, and practical contributions to the literature. The phenomenal success of this work testifies to the potency of crises as killer empirical applications. Inspired by Allison’s enduring tripartite (metatheoretical, theoretical-conceptual, and practical) contribution to the foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature, this essay will attempt to outline some past and potential contributions that the interdisciplinary discourse on crisis can make to the FPA agenda.

### Torture

#### Judicial Review is key to preventing torture

Amnesty 5 (Amnesty International USA, Guantanamo, and Beyond: The Continuing Pursuit of Unchecked Executive Power, May 13, 2005, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510632005)

Judicial review of the lawfulness of detentions is a fundamental safeguard against arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, and "disappearance". Unsurprisingly, then, with the US courts having been kept out of reviewing the cases for more than three years, there is evidence that all these categories of abuse have occurred at the hands of US authorities in the "war on terror". Indeed, Amnesty International believes that abuses have been the result of official policies and policy failures and linked to the executive decision to leave detainees unprotected by not only the courts, but also by the prohibition on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as defined under international humanitarian and human rights treaties binding on the USA. The US administration still does not believe itself legally bound by the Geneva Conventions in relation to the detainees in Guantánamo, Afghanistan and in secret locations, by customary international law, or by the human rights treaty prohibition on the use of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in the case of foreign detainees in US custody held outside of US sovereign territory. Nor has it expressly abandoned the notion that the President may in times of war ignore all the USA’s international legal obligations and order torture, or that torturers may be exempted from criminal liability by entering a plea of "necessity" or "self-defence" (see below).

#### Torture is a deontological evil that must be rejected

Gross 4 (Oren Gross, Professor, Law, University of Minnesota, MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW, June 2004, p. 1492-1493.)

Absolutists - those who believe that an unconditional ban on torture ought to apply without exception regardless of circumstances - often base their position on deontological grounds. For adherents of the absolutist view of morality, torture is intrinsically wrong. It violates the physical and mental integrity of the person subjected to it, negates her autonomy, and deprives her of human dignity. It reduces her to a mere object, a body from which information is to be extracted; it coerces her to act in a manner that may be contrary to her most fundamental beliefs, values, and interests, depriving her of any choice and controlling her voice. Torture is also wrong because of its depraving and corrupting effects on individual torturers and society at large. Moreover, torture is an evil that can never be justified or excused. Under no circumstances should the resort to torture be morally acceptable or legally permissible. It is a reprehensible action whose wrongfulness may never be assuaged or rectified morally even if the consequences of taking such action in any particular case are deemed to be, on the whole, good. Indeed, one may argue that the inherent wrongfulness of torture and possible good consequences are incommensurable, i.e., they cannot be measured by any common currency and therefore cannot be compared, or balanced, one against the other. The conclusion drawn from such a claim is that "the wrong of torture can be taken as a trump or side constraint on welfare maximization in all possible cases."

## Heg DA

### 2AC Heg DA

#### Aff kt offshore balancing- co-op impossible without it

Scheinin 12 (Martin Scheinin 12 is Professor of International Law and Former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism, "Should Human Rights Take a Back Seat in Wartime?" 1-11-12, www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/01/11/national\_defense\_authorization\_act\_scheinin\_interview-full.html, DOA: 7-23-13)

CLC: As a world leader and active promoter of universal human rights, the practice of indefinite detention without charge would seem to clash with U.S. ideals. Could you comment on this contradiction? MS: One of the main lessons learned in the international fight against terrorism is that counter-terrorism professionals have gradually come to learn and admit that human rights violations are not an acceptable shortcut in an effective fight against terrorism. Such measures tend to backfire in multiple ways. They result in legal problems by hampering prosecution, trial and punishment. The use of torture is a clear example here. They also tend to alienate the communities with which authorities should be working in order to detect and prevent terrorism. And they add to causes of terrorism, both by perpetuating "root causes" that involve the alienation of communities and by providing "triggering causes" through which bitter individuals make the morally inexcusable decision to turn to methods of terrorism. The NDAA is just one more step in the wrong direction, by aggravating the counterproductive effects of human rights violating measures put in place in the name of countering terrorism. CLC: Does the NDAA afford the U.S. a practical advantage in the fight against terrorism? Or might the law undermine its global credibility? MS: It is hard to see any practical advantage gained through the NDAA. It is just another form of what I call symbolic legislation, enacted because the legislators want to be seen as being "tough" or as "doing something." The law is written as just affirming existing powers and practices and hence not providing any meaningful new tools in the combat of terrorism. By constraining the choices by the executive, it nevertheless hampers effective counter-terrorism work, including criminal investigation and prosecution, as well as international counter-terrorism cooperation, markedly in the issue of closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Hence, it carries the risk of distancing the United States from its closest allies and the international community generally. And of course these kinds of legal provisions are always open for bad faith copying by repressive governments that will use them for their own political purposes. CLC: Do you think the U.S. adoption of the indefinite detention provisions sets a precedent for other countries to do so? MS: Of course, these kinds of legal provisions are always open for bad faith copying by repressive governments that will use them for their own political purposes. Nevertheless, one of the conclusions I drew at the end of my six-year tenure as United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism was that such copying of bad laws is less frequent than expected. It is much more common that countries are willing to learn from each other about what really works in the fight against terrorism, and for my part I did my best to identify and promote such best practice. There are a lot of good models showing how laws can at the same time comply with human rights and produce real results in the fight against terrorism. I don't think countries genuinely concerned about terrorism will be tempted to follow the NDAA approach. But repressive governments may do so for their own political purposes.

#### The aff doesn’t affect overall credibilith

**Gray ’11** [Colin S, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England, and Founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, “Hard Power And Soft Power: The Utility Of Military Force as An Instrument Of Policy In The 21st Century,” April, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1059>]

It bears repeating because it passes unnoticed that culture, and indeed civilization itself, are dynamic, not static phenomena. They are what they are for good and sufficient local geographical and historical reasons, and cannot easily be adapted to fit changing political and strategic needs. For an obvious example, the dominant American strategic culture, though allowing exceptions, still retains its principal features, the exploitation of technology and mass.45 These features can be pathological when circumstances are not narrowly conducive to their exploitation. Much as it was feared only a very few years ago that, in reaction to the neglect of culture for decades previously, the cultural turn in strategic studies was too sharp, so today there is a danger that the critique of strategic culturalism is proceeding too far.46 The error lies in the search for, and inevitable finding of, “golden keys” and “silver bullets” to resolve current versions of enduring problems. Soft-power salesmen have a potent product-mix to sell, but they fail to appreciate the reality that American soft power is a product essentially unalterable over a short span of years. As a country with a cultural or civilizational brand that is unique and mainly rooted in deep historical, geographical, and ideational roots, America is not at liberty to emulate a major car manufacturer and advertise an extensive and varied model range of persuasive soft-power profiles. Of course, some elements of soft power can be emphasized purposefully in tailored word and deed. However, foreign perceptions of the United States are no more developed from a blank page than the American past can be retooled and fine-tuned for contemporary advantage. Frustrating though it may be, a country cannot easily escape legacies from its past.

#### NSA scandal outweighs

**AP ’13** [Associated Press, “US counterterrorism officials defend Internet and phone surveillance to skeptical lawmakers,” June 12, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/06/12/us-counterterrorism-officials-defend-internet-and-phone-surveillance-to/>]

Lawmakers voiced their confusion and concern, and some called for the end of sweeping surveillance programs by U.S. spy agencies after receiving an unusual briefing on the government's yearslong collection of phone records and Internet usage.¶ "People aren't satisfied," Rep. Tim Murphy, R-Pa., said as he left the briefing Tuesday. "More detail needs to come out."¶ The phalanx of FBI, legal and intelligence officials who briefed the entire House was the latest attempt to soothe outrage over National Security Agency programs that collect billions of Americans' phone and Internet records. Since they were revealed last week, the programs have spurred distrust in the Obama administration from around the world.¶ Congressional leaders and intelligence committee members have been routinely briefed about the spy programs, officials said, and Congress has at least twice renewed laws approving them. But the disclosure of their sheer scope stunned some lawmakers, shocked foreign allies from nations with strict privacy protections and emboldened civil liberties advocates who long have accused the government of being too invasive in the name of national security.

.

#### Heg is durable -- status quo conditions and international cooperation ensure sustainability

Monteiro 11 - Nuno P., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (June 13, 2011, “BALANCING ACT WHY UNIPOLARITY MAY BE DURABLE,” http://www.nunomonteiro.org/wp-content/uploads/Nuno-Monteiro-Balancing-Act-20110613.pdf)

What is, then, wrong with the argument that unipolarity is indeed durable? Why are primacists not right? If **the impact of the nuclear revolution on the structure of international politics reduces the salience of survival concerns for major powers, then unipolarity should necessarily last**. 44 This should settle the debate on unipolar durability in favor of primacist views. Not so fast. Sur**vival is indeed the first goal of states and, therefore, nuclear weapons, by guaranteeing state survival, eliminate the need for major powers to balance against a unipole**. But states do not care only about survival. Economic growth is also important for states, for at least two reasons. First, states care about economic growth as an end in itself. 45 One of the primary raisons d’être of the state is, after all, the well-being of its citizens, defined largely in terms of material wealth. Second, and more importantly for the purposes of this paper, states care about economic growth also for security reasons. If a major power is prevented from continuing to grow economically, then its future security may be imperiled. Nothing ensures xthat nuclear weapons will continue to guarantee survival indefinitely. A major technological breakthrough, such as comprehensive missile defense, might erode the deterring effect of a survivable nuclear arsenal. Major powers therefore have strong incentives not to fall behind in economic terms. But this pursuit of wealth is subordinated to survival concerns. In other words**, I expect major powers to pursue wealth only once the goal of state survival is fully ensured and in ways that do not undermine it.** To borrow a concept from John Rawls, this means that **survival has ‘lexical priority’ over all other state aims, including wealth creation**. 46 What does this mean for balancing and, consequently, for the durability of a unipolar world? In the previous section, I introduced a revised logic of balancing focused exclusively on the goal of state survival. It is now time to expand it to account for the secondary goal of economic growth. This means that (2’) must be revised to include not only threats to state survival but also to their economic growth. In the expanded logic, then, states will (3’) balance against concentrated power to the extent that it threatens both these goals. Consequently, **states will now balance until they minimize** (4’’) **both threats to their survival and to their economic growth**. The expanded logic goes like this (with italics indicating change from the revised version above): 1) **States care first and foremost about their own survival and only pursue other goals**, such as wealth, to the extent they do not threaten survival; 2’’) An **unmatched concentration of power in one state may threaten the survival of others as well as their pursuit of economic growth;** 3’) To the extent that it does, **other states will balance against concentrated power**; 4’’) **Threats to survival and to economic growth may be minimized short of amassing as much or more power than any other state**; 5’) **Balancing efforts will therefore not necessarily lead to shifts in the systemic balance-of-power**; 6’) As a result**, unmatched concentrations of power in one state may be longlasting.** The result (6’) is the same. But **the conditions of possibility for an unmatched concentration of power in one state to be long-lasting have changed**. Now, the **durability of unipolarity depends, beyond major powers’ guaranteed survival, on** a second factor: **the presence of international conditions that make the continuation of their economic growth possible**. The absence of such conditions, by endangering the long-term ability of the state to maintain its deterrent capability, ultimately places the survival of the state at risk. Therefore, **major powers have a strong incentive to balance against a unipole that is** -- purposely or not -- **containing their economic growth**. This extends the conditions of possibility of a durable unipolar world from the structural to the strategic level. In a nutshell**, if a major power’s economic growth is constrained by the unipole’s strategy then that major power has incentives to continue to balance against the unipole beyond the point at which nuclear weapons ensure its immediate survival.** In sum, **a strategy of containment on the part of the unipole**, by constraining the economic growth of major powers, will lead the latter to balance, converting their latent capabilities into military power. **Containment**, therefore, **leads major powers to balance beyond the point at which their immediate survival is guaranteed**, up to the point at which they effect a shift in the systemic balance of power, bringing about the end of unipolarity. **A strategy of accommodation**, on the contrary, **allows major powers to continue their economic growth**, **thus guaranteeing that their immediate ability to secure their own survival will not be eroded over time.** By doing so, a**ccommodation takes away the incentives major powers might have to balance beyond the point at which their immediate survival is guaranteed.** Consequently, **a strategy of accommodation** -- when implemented under conditions in which survival may be guaranteed even in the absence of a systemic balance of power -- **makes unipolarity durable.** V. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS AND ILLUSTRATION This section extracts empirical implications from my theory and tests the argument against the evolving empirical record. My “qualified durability” argument yields two empirical implications for contemporary world politics. First, **for as long as the United States pursues a strategy of economic accommodation, major powers, all of which today possess a survivable nuclear arsenal, should not pursue further balancing against the United States**. Second, **in case the United States shifts towards a strategy of containment, major powers should initiate a balancing effort, increasing the rate at which they convert their latent power into military capabilities and pooling those capabilities together through the formation of alliances, eventually shifting the systemic balance of power and putting an end to unipolarity.**

#### Offshore balancing fails – It won’t be adopted as a strategy, and would balance too late

Lind 6 – New American Foundation [http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond\_american\_hegemony\_5381 Michael Lind, Iss. 89, pg. 9, “Beyond American Hegemony”, Accessed July 24,]

Another option favored by some realists and libertarians, **an offshore-balancing strategy, is unlikely to be adopted and would be unwise.** **The offshore-balancing strategy would have the United States intervene only at the last moment to "tip the balance" against one side** in a contest among Eurasian great powers-China versus Japan, or Russia versus Germany or the European Union**. It would be far better for the United States to maintain a role in diplomacy and security** in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, **in the hope of defusing conflicts and deterring aggressors**,

## CMR

### 2AC CMR DA

#### CMR will never collapse

Andrew Exum 12 is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and teaches a course in low-intensity conflict at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, Abu Muqawama: No Crisis in Wartime U.S. Civil-Military Relations, July 4, 2012, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12126/abu-muqawama-no-crisis-in-wartime-u-s-civil-military-relations>)

Last week, I noted one of the ironies of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan since 2009: From the perspective of civil-military relations, the process worked. Regardless of one's opinion of the Obama administration’s strategy in Afghanistan and despite the high degree to which the U.S. government and its allies have struggled to implement that strategy, the division of labor between civilian officials and military officers in formulating the strategy itself functioned more or less according to design. In our thinking on civil-military relations, and next week, I will offer my thoughts on the state of civil-military relations in the United States today and offer policy recommendations to improve them. I should say from the start that I do not believe there to be any "crisis" in civil-military relations in the United States. Several wise scholars -- most notably Andrew Bacevich and Richard Kohn -- have argued there is such a crisis. And I share many of the concerns both of them raise, from the fetishization of military service to the active involvement of retired general officers in political campaigns. But either because I am writing from France -- which does have a history of toxic and even mutinous civil-military relations in its recent democratic past -- or because I remember historical accounts of the days when Douglas MacArthur used his military staff to plot his political career, I consider contemporary civil-military relations in the United States to be quite healthy. In addressing the issue, I will consider civil-military relations only as they pertain to the prosecution of war itself. I am less concerned by civil-military relations in peacetime, though for many of the reasons Bacevich and Kohn raise, this subject is also worth considering. The canonical text on civil-military relations in the United States remains Samuel Huntington's “The Soldier and the State” (1957). If we start with the belief that war takes place on four levels -- the political, the strategic, the operational and the tactical -- Huntington's model reserves the role of defining the political ends of a war for elected civilian leaders, while assigning the operational and tactical levels of war to the professional military officers. As for the strategic aims of a conflict as well as the resources the nation will devote to its prosecution, civilians and military officers decide on them together in Huntington’s model. It is not clear whether or not Huntington entirely intended for his scholarly work to be normative. Regardless, successive generations of U.S. military officers have been raised in the belief that Huntington's model is the way in which the division of labor in war is supposed to be organized. Military officers thus resent it when civilian officials stick their noses into tactical and operational affairs. As Eliot Cohen ably demonstrates in “Supreme Command” (2002), however, civilians do sometimes stick their noses into the tactical and operational affairs of the military -- and often to positive effect. Choosing historical examples ranging from Abraham Lincoln to David Ben-Gurion, Cohen demonstrates why it is sometimes necessary for politicians to get their hands dirty running a war. After all, war is fundamentally a political affair -- and it really is sometimes too important to be left to the generals. A statesman who ignores military affairs can be as much of a menace as a statesman who fancies himself a better tactician than his generals. U.S. military officers, as a whole, dislike Cohen's arguments for reasons that should be obvious to all. These officers reflexively resent what they see as "interference" in their affairs. What those officers perhaps miss is that among Cohen's intended audience was a certain former governor of Texas who Cohen feared was not as interested in military affairs as he needed to be having become president. Indeed, George W. Bush learned the hard way -- and at the cost of much U.S. blood and treasure -- that even though the U.S. military will insist as an institution that its general officers are equally able, that is not always the case. Some officers are better than others, and one of the more important decisions a president can make is in his selection of commander. To the chagrin of military officers, then, the division of labor between civilian officials and military officers in wartime is not fixed. Civilians have long reserved the right to interfere in military affairs. Lincoln and Ben-Gurion did this to positive effect. Adolf Hitler, among others, did so in such a way that his meddling hamstrung his generals. What is rigidly fixed in the U.S. system of government, however, is civilian supremacy over the military. Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives the U.S. Congress the sole right to declare war, while Article II establishes the president as the commander-in-chief. Remarkably, the civilian leadership of the United States has never faced a serious threat by the military to usurp powers reserved for civilian authorities. Only MacArthur mounted a serious challenge -- a series of challenges, really -- to civilian authorities, and even he was eventually put in his place. Those who fear that civil-military relations in the United States are in crisis -- and these fears reached an apex in 2009 -- lack both comparative and historical perspective. The 82nd Airborne Division might not have done the best job in Iraq’s al-Anbar province in 2003, but unlike its French counterparts, it has never threatened to jump onto the Washington mall and overthrow the government. And despite the fears of many pundits in 2009 that high-profile general officers such as David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal harbored secret ambitions to undermine a young Democratic president, both men now happily and humbly serve as civilians in that same president's administration. Arguments that the U.S. military somehow “forced” Obama to deploy more troops to Afghanistan in 2009 are hard to believe, especially when the military advice the president received was divided. Despite his Nobel Prize for Peace, Obama has not shied away from the use of force, and in the way he decided on the time and pace of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, he displayed that he has ample courage to overrule the advice of his military advisers. Any talk about how the president was pushed around by the military in 2009 is more likely an effort by some of the president’s well-meaning aides to distance their boss from an unpopular war that he undeniably escalated twice, in both March and December of 2009.

#### The abstention advantage link turns the DA

Mazur 10 (Diane, Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law, "A More Perfect Military: How the Constitution Can Make Our Military Stronger" Oxford University Press, Print)

One of the ways the doctrine of judicial deference has left a scar on civil-military relations is by changing how civilian government manages the military advice it receives. I don't meant to suggest this is a new problem for civilian control of the military—President Harry Truman certainly struggled to manage the military advice offered by General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War1—but judicial deference has contributed to a more pervasive problem broadly affecting the way civilians engage with information from military sources. Strictly speaking, judicial deference in military affairs applies only when constitutional or legal issues are in play. When the question is whether a particular military policy or plan of action is a wise or prudent thing to do, and not whether it is constitutional or lawful, courts have no role in answering the question and judicial deference is irrelevant. However, because judicial deference has expanded beyond an abstract legal theory into a more general way of thinking about military affairs, it has come to have an indirect effect on all forms of military decision making by civilian officials. Deference in a strictly legal sense is only a part of the broad cultural deference on military issues we have adopted since the end of the Vietnam War. We consistently discourage civilians from serious engagement with military issues. Wc assume most civilians arc incapable of understanding the military and have little to add to the conversation. We suspect they have not earned the right to speak about military affairs, even though at some level we must know civilian engagement is necessary in a system built on civilian control of the military. There is always a risk that asking too many questions will be interpreted as a lack of support for the military, and so the easier path is often to endorse whatever appears to be the consensus "military" position on an issue, whether or not the consensus position is actually helpful to the military. Our inclination toward deference in matters involving the military is so strong that military advice can sometimes carry the power of a military veto when the advice becomes part of public debate. Few government officials want to be in the position of asking for the military's viewpoint on an issue and then choosing a policy direction inconsistent with that viewpoint. As a result, civilians may package or present military advice in a way that mis-lcadingly removes any conflict with civilian policy preference, ensuring at least the appearance of a deferential attitude. The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" debate offered a good example of this phenomenon. Congress put on what were essentially "show hearings" to create the appearance of unified military opposition to gay citizens in military service. I don't doubt that in 1993 military opposition outweighed military support, but the hearings were carefully scrubbed of any military expertise from the minority viewpoint. The military's increasing political partisanship also plays an important role in how we characterize and respond to military advice, and there may be no better example of why political partisanship is damaging to military professionalism. At the same time civilians have an incentive to package military opinion selectively for favorable effect, the military may also feel an obligation to shape the advice it gives (or to withhold contrary opinions) in an effort to be loyal to a particular political interest. Political partisanship within the military imposes great pressure on military professionals to produce advice supportive of its political allegiance. At the very least, there will always be an air of uncertainty as to whether military advice has been tainted by a desire to either support or undercut the commander in chief or the Congress. Even the general public responds to military advice differently depending on whether the advice matches expectations about the military's presumed political allegiance. When military officials were uncooperative to the point of being insubordinate and refused to seriously consider how to implement President Clinton's proposal to end sexual orientation discrimination in the military, most people believed they were simply following their professional obligation to give civilian leaders candid military advice. We are so comfortable with the idea of military testimony running counter to policy preferences of the Democratic Party that no one objected when General Colin Powell gave a speech at the Naval Academy encouraging midshipmen to resign if they believed they could not morally serve in a military that also permitted gay people to serve." That's not advice, that's insubordination. On the other hand, when military advice upsets the careful civil-military consensus we usually construct for public consumption and also runs counter to the military's expected political allegiances, people take notice and ask whether the military has violated its ethical obligation of subordination to civilian control. The recent example of note occurred when General Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, responded to a question during a Senate hearing asking how large a force would be necessary to maintain public order in Iraq following an invasion. This was information Congress needed to know in order to carry out its constitutional responsibilities to declare war and fund military operations. Shinseki responded with a significantly higher number than the administration's party line, and it began a debate among civil-military experts that continues today. A scries of essays in the professional journal Armed Forces and Society examined the controversy,5 and one author seriously argued Shinseki had a professional obligation to answer in a way that would protect the president from the perception he might be acting against military advice, or at least without a consensus military opinion.'1 Our system of civilian control of the military included, according to this argument, an obligation on the part of military professionals to adjust their advice to shore up civilian policy preferences. I have a feeling, however, the same ethical argument would not have been made on behalf of a Democratic Party commander in chief. The solution is both simple to understand and difficult to achieve. If we were more comfortable with open engagement and conversation about military advice—if we were more comfortable with robust, messy debate about military issues—it would not be so important to shape or distort military advice to match civilian preferences. If we were more comfortable with military viewpoints, and believed we could invite them, consider them, weigh their strengths and weaknesses, balance them against other nonmilitary concerns, and then, if necessary, make a decision inconsistent with those viewpoints, our civil-military relations would be much healthier. This is the same dynamic that inhibits a healthy civil-military exchange in judicial settings. We believe the system cannot tolerate the complexity or the inconvenience of real information, and so we construct a system specifically designed to generate a false consensus—the doctrine of judicial deference—so we can all feel better about making military decisions.

#### CMR decline inevitable – internal distrust and censoring

Peter Feaver (writer for Foreign Policy) January 17, 2014 “If You Don't Want Generals to Speak Out, You Must Speak Up” http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/01/17/if\_you\_dont\_want\_generals\_to\_speak\_out\_you\_must\_speak\_up

Do senior military officers speak out too much when they disagree with the policies their commander in chief is considering?¶ Former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates says he thinks the military talks too much. He notes that this problem hasn't been unique to President Barack Obama's tenure. During George W. Bush's administration, Adm. William Fallon, for instance, clearly crossed Gates's line in airing his opinions about Iran policy, and he left his command abruptly as a result. But Gates, during his secretaryship, found Obama to be especially exercised about this issue, and Gates attributes much of the civil-military problems in the Obama era to the way that White House political advisors seethed at hearing military opinion, particularly when expressed in public.¶ Respected military historian Hew Strachan says these concerns are overblown. Author of a forthcoming book on civil-military relations in wartime, Strachan told the Daily Beast:¶ "The concern about the military speaking out shows a lack of democratic and political maturity. We're not facing the danger of a military coup. The professional experts, who deal with war all the time, should be able to express their views all the time, openly and coherently, just as you would expect a doctor or a teacher to express their views coherently about how you run medical policy or teaching policy."¶ This is a long-standing debate among civil-military relations specialists. At one extreme end are folks like Andrew Milburn who argue that the military has an obligation and duty to thwart civilians who are considering unwise policies; the most effective way to do that is to speak out to Congress, the media, and the general public whenever the president is tempted to err. My own academic work is closer to the other end of the spectrum: I have called doing end runs around the president in this way "shirking," a subversion of civilian control. ¶ But I would not muzzle the military entirely. Of course, the military's primary obligation is to provide its most candid advice privately to the administration. Nevertheless, the military does have a legitimate role in speaking outside the administration. For starters, senior military officers must testify before Congress. When they do, they are obliged to explain the administration's position and also, if asked, to give their independent military opinion, even if it differs from the administration's position. They cannot merely give their own opinion, however; they must also explain the administration's position if it diverges from their own. Moreover, the military can and should explain military policy to the general public, and the best way to do that is through the media.¶ This public role is tricky. The military must be wary lest it find itself carrying political water for an administration unwilling or unable to defend its own policies. The military also must speak without subverting the chain of command and the integrity of the internal policymaking process. That means that the military must be careful not to speak with the intention of mobilizing public opinion against administration policy; that was the line that Fallon crossed. And, of course, the military should not speak disrespectfully about the commander in chief, regardless of its private views; that was the line Gen. Stanley McChrystal crossed, which resulted in his early retirement.¶ If what Gates is saying is that the more often you speak to the media and the public, the more likely you are to inadvertently stray across one of these lines, then I have some sympathy with his position. I think the issue is less quantity than quality. Some military leaders are very good at staying within the lines and can speak for hours without crossing one; others cross the line within minutes of clearing their throat.¶ But what if Gates and other critics are making a more general point: that any speaking out by the military beyond the most banal statements about "God bless the troops" is a civil-military violation?¶ If so, I think that goes too far, even though I understand the impulse behind it. I think the military can rightfully speak out a bit more than that without crossing the civil-military line, though it must be very careful as it does so.¶ Here's the thing, however: If you are the secretary of defense and you want to muzzle the military that much, then you must unmuzzle yourself by a corresponding amount. And Gates did not do that. One of the most striking revelations in the book -- and now that I've thought about it for a week, perhaps the most striking revelation in the book -- is how many times Gates muzzled himself. Time after time, Gates records in his memoirs that he was dismayed at the attitudes expressed by the president and the other senior civilians, especially attitudes toward the military and on vital national security matters. And time after time, Gates records that he really wanted to say something but did not.¶ Gates failure to speak up was not a matter of l'esprit de l'escalier, like George Costanza's frustration with delivering a snappy comeback in a timely manner. On the contrary, it appears to be calculated: Time after time, Gates just chose not to speak up.¶ Former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, a key shaper of the process that Gates is criticizing in the book, told National Journal that Gates did speak up: "I have to say I don't see anything that Secretary Gates says in the book that he didn't raise as an issue at the time." And according to the same National Journal story, Gates appears to confirm that, telling reporters, "there wasn't a single issue" he didn't raise in office that he addressed later in his book, whether about Afghanistan, Iraq, European missile defense, or the administration's program of "outreach" to Iran. Gates added: "I agreed with him [Obama] on all those things. My continuing concerns were more process concerns. I did raise those all the time with Tom Donilon, [former National Security Advisor] Jim Jones, and others."¶ But did he raise it with the one person who mattered most, the president? According to his memoir, he did not.¶ And so the Obama administration's fractious civil-military relations continued, observed but unaddressed, because no one would raise it with the boss. As Shadow Government contributor Kori Schake suggests, there were plenty of respectful ways Gates could have contributed the necessary corrective. To be sure, it must be conceded, even if he had, the political imperatives driving the behavior of Obama and the White House might have trumped anything Gates could have said. But at least he would have said it, and the fact that the secretary of defense spoke up on behalf of healthier civil-military relations would have resonated back with the rank and file -- and that, by itself, would have contributed to healthier civil-military relations.

#### Afghanistan and Iraq disprove the link- no threshold for collapse

Desch 10 - professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame (Michael, “Why have the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan been so corrosive of civil-military relations?” Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/17/why\_have\_the\_wars\_in\_iraq\_and\_afghanistan\_been\_so\_corrosive\_of-civil\_military\_relations)

Low-intensity **conflict between the Obama administration and the key elements of the U.S. military** charged with conducting the war in Afghanistan (ISAF Commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal, CENTCOM commander Gen. David Petraeus, and Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen) **is such a constant theme in Woodward's account that the president feels the need in his valedictory interview to deny that civil-military conflict over the strategy and force-levels of the Afghanistan war is as bad as it had been during the Vietnam War** (p. 377). If civil-military relations aren't that bad, then why even mention them? The answer is clear: **The Iraq and Afghan wars have seriously frayed the fabric civil-military** in the United States, perhaps not yet at the level of the Vietnam War, but certainly heading in that direction. **Beginning with the pre-Iraq war debate between Army Chief of Staff** General Eric **Shinseki** **and Deputy Secretary of Defense** Paul **Wolfowitz over the appropriate force levels for** the Phase IV operation in **Iraq, continuing through the so-called "revolt of the generals" over Iraq strategy as the situation there deteriorated, and culminating in the contentious fall 2009 Afghan strategy review, these wars have divided civilian leaders and important segments of the military in a way not seen since** the rancorous civil-military debates about the conduct of the **Vietnam** War of the late 1960s. These battles are for high stakes. Witness the spectacles of a **civilian official like Wolfowitz with no military experience publicly dismissing as "widely off the mark" the Army Chief of Staff's estimates of appropriate force levels** (which the latter calculated based on his direct experience in peace-keeping operations in the Balkans) **to the former ISAF commander and his staff popping-off to Rolling Stone magazine about the foibles of some of the key national security players in the Obama White House.** For those who might take comfort in the fact that Obama fired the ham-handed McChrystal and replaced him with the much smoother (but also far more politically engaged Gen. David Petraeus, Woodward's book offers small comfort. If anything, **Petreaus presents a far more difficult challenge for the commander-in-chief precisely because of his political acumen and close ties with Republicans** like Senator Lindsey Graham, which Woodward amply documents. Why have the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan been so corrosive of the fragile metal of civil-military relations? There is a natural tendency to attribute it to personalities: Wolfowitz was a neoconservative true-believer who like his boss Donald Rumsfeld regarded the military as yet another bureaucratic obstacle to their efforts foster radical transformation in the Pentagon and around the world. Conversely, Petraeus may be unique among American general officers in his intellect and ambition: if Douglass MacArthur was the American Caesar, in William Manchester's eponymous book, Iraq and Afghanistan could one day make Petraeus our General Smith goes to Washington. But there is more to the story than just personalities. Indeed, it is precisely **the nature of the wars** we are waging **in Iraq and Afghanistan** that **make a high level of civil-military conflict all but inevitable** in them **because both wars involve** substantial counterinsurgency (**COIN**)

h**and nation-building** operations. In his classic book The Soldier and the State, the late Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington outlined the influential framework for stable civilian control of the military in a democratic society based upon a division of labor he called "objective control": In return for complete civilian supremacy in the political realm (when and where to go to war), the military would be given substantial lee-way at the operational level (how to wage the war). This framework was not perfect, but it nonetheless has provided the best possible way to balance the twin goals of military effectiveness and civilian supremacy. Objective control worked reasonably well in the context of conventional military operations during the Second World War and the Cold War, in which the distinction between the "political" and the "military-operational" realms was reasonably clear. In contrast, **COIN and nation-building make civil-military conflict much more likely** precisely **because they blur the distinction between the "political" and the "military" realms.** Nothing better illustrates this fact than that every-soldier of the post-cold War era, the "strategic corporal," who in our current wars must fight on one block, deliver aid on the next, and provide a seminar on local politics on the third. In COIN and nation-building, the distinction central to the old balance that kept the civil-military peace from the post-Vietnam years until the end of the Cold War has been largely erased, with **the consequences we are living with today, and likely to have to deal with for as long as we are conducting these sorts of military operations.** To be sure, civil-military conflict isn't the only battle on the home-front chronicled in Obama's Wars. **The president's fear of what a protracted military engagement in Afghanistan will do** **to his Democratic base is palpable,** and he may harvest the first fruits of this disenchantment in a few weeks. Likewise, **it is also becoming clear that whole COIN/nation-building approach is dividing the military** internally, between the "COINdinistas" and the "big Army," and increasingly with those services (the Air Force and the Navy) who have a vested bureaucratic interest (and a plausible strategic rationale) for focusing on other sorts of military operations. All of this makes it likely that **for the foreseeable future, the political and bureaucratic wars within will remain as intense** and potentially damaging as the military wars without. **We must, therefore, count fraying civil-military relations and other domestic bureaucratic and political conflict as yet another cost of Obama's** (and Bush's) **wars.**

# 1AR

## Afghan

### AT: Alt Causes in ICG

#### Here’s the card jack promised

USAID 13 (February, “Fact Sheet Infrastructure Sector- Feb 2013”, download here- <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/programs/infrastructure#Tab=Description>)

ENERGY Surveys indicate increased electricity supply is a top priority for Afghans. USAID efforts have significantly increased access to electricity among the Afghan population. USAID has supported the Afghan government in coordinating multi-donor efforts to build the North East Power System (NEPS) needed to transmit low-cost power from Uzbekistan to Kabul and other major population centers in Afghanistan. The U.S. has also rehabilitated part of Kajaki hydropower facility resulting in a doubling of the hydropower generation capacity of the dam. In addition, USAID constructed the Tarakhil Power Plant, which provides up to 105 Megawatts (MW) of backup power to Kabul and those living in communities supported by NEPS. USAID’s current priorities in the power sector include the

NEPS SEPS connector project, also known as PTEC, planned to bring inexpensive imported grid power to a much wider Afghan population. Another priority is to work with Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS) to install the third turbine at Kajaki Dam and investments to improve distribution and transmission in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. A key component of the U.S.-Afghan energy strategy is increasing the number of Afghans working in the power sector. In concert with this effort, USAID is actively supporting the commercialization of the national state-owned utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS). Collections improvements at DABS has doubled revenues in two years and increased power distribution by 18 percent. In addition to large-scale projects, the U.S. assists more than 300 rural communities gain access to advanced technologies to power their homes, schools, and businesses through clean, renewable energy, such as micro-hydropower, solar, and wind projects. ROADS An expanded and improved road network supports increased economic activity while enabling Afghans to access key services such as healthcare and education. USAID has funded the rehabilitation of more than 2,000 km of regional, national, provincial, and rural roads. Construction of a 105 km road from the city of Keshim to the city of Faizabad was completed in 2011, and highlights the benefits of economic gains from new and improved roads. The number of new businesses such as fuel stations and markets has substantially increased, commercial bus activity has increased, and market prices have declined along the road’s path because of increased efficiency relating to transportation. Ongoing U.S.-funded projects include rehabilitation of a national highway linking Khost and Gardez to the Ring Road. USAID worked closely with the Afghan government and the private-sector to maintain more than 2,500 km of roads nationwide. USAID projects strengthen the capacity of government staff in road design and support national efforts to establish an independent road authority and road fund that will enable efficient long-term management and maintenance of the transportation infrastructure. WATER & SANITATION Currently, only 27 percent of Afghan rural households have access to safe drinking water. In partnership with the Afghan government, USAID has increased access to safe drinking water to rural communities by constructing over 26,000 wells. Where well water has been provided, sanitation facilities have been improved and nearly 33,000 latrines have been built or renovated improving the health of Afghans. USAID also supports the government’s water and sanitation sector reforms, which seek to commercialize the urban water sector, increase cost recovery, and improve management. In addition, USAID is working to develop river basin master plans that will allow the Afghan government to optimize its future water resource development.